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Abstract
Mean field games are limit models for symmetric N -player games
with interaction of mean field type as N → ∞. The limit relation
is often understood in the sense that a solution of a mean field game
allows to construct approximate Nash equilibria for the corresponding
N -player games. The opposite direction is of interest, too: When
do sequences of Nash equilibria converge to solutions of an associated
mean field game? In this direction, rigorous results are mostly available
for stationary problems with ergodic costs. Here, we identify limit
points of sequences of certain approximate Nash equilibria as solutions
to mean field games for problems with Itô-type dynamics and costs over
a finite time horizon. Limits are studied through weak convergence
of associated normalized occupation measures and identified using a
probabilistic notion of solution for mean field games.
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1 Introduction
Mean field games, as introduced by J.M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions [Lasry and Lions,
2006a,b, 2007] and, independently, by M. Huang, R.P. Malhamé, and P.E. Caines
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[Huang et al., 2006, and subsequent works], are limit models for symmet-
ric non-zero-sum non-cooperative N -player games with interaction of mean
field type as the number of players tends to infinity. The limit relation
is often understood in the sense that a solution of the mean field game
allows to construct approximate Nash equilibria for the corresponding N -
player games if N is sufficiently large; see, for instance, Huang et al. [2006],
Kolokoltsov et al. [2011], Carmona and Delarue [2013], and Carmona and Lacker
[2015]. This direction is useful from a practical point of view since the model
of interest is commonly the N -player game with N big so that a direct com-
putation of Nash equilibria is not feasible.
The opposite direction in the limit relation is of interest, too: When and
in which sense do sequences of Nash equilibria for the N -player games con-
verge to solutions of a corresponding mean field game? An answer to this
question is useful as it provides information on what kind of Nash equilibria
can be captured by the mean field game approach. In view of the theory
of McKean-Vlasov limits and propagation of chaos for uncontrolled weakly
interacting systems [cf. McKean, 1966, Sznitman, 1991], one may expect to
obtain convergence results for broad classes of systems, at least under some
symmetry conditions on the Nash equilibria. This heuristic was the origi-
nal motivation in the introduction of mean field games by Lasry and Lions.
Rigorous results supporting it are nonetheless few, and they mostly apply to
stationary problems with ergodic costs and special structure (in particular,
affine-linear dynamics and convex costs); see Lasry and Lions [2007], Feleqi
[2013], Bardi and Priuli [2013, 2014]. For non-stationary problems, the pas-
sage to the limit has been established rigorously in Gomes et al. [2013] for
a class of continuous-time finite horizon problems with finite state space,
but only if the time horizon is sufficiently small. Moreover, in the situa-
tion studied there, Nash equilibria for the N -player games are unique in a
class of symmetric Markovian feedback strategies. The above cited works
on the passage to the limit all employ methods from the theory of ordinary
or partial differential equations, in particular, equations of Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman-type. In Lacker [2015b], which appeared as preprint three months
after submission of the present paper, a general characterization of the limit
points of N -player Nash equilibria is obtained through probabilistic meth-
ods. We come back to that work, which also covers mean field games with
common noise, in the second but last paragraph of this section.
Here, we study the limit relation between symmetric N -player games
and mean field games in the direction of the Lasry-Lions heuristic for con-
tinuous time finite horizon problems with fairly general cost structure and
Itô-type dynamics. The aim is to identify limit points of sequences of sym-
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metric Nash equilibria for the N -player games as solutions of a mean field
game. For a general introduction to mean field games, see Cardaliaguet
[2013] or Carmona et al. [2013]. The latter work also explains the difference
in the limit relation that distinguishes mean field games from optimal control
problems of McKean-Vlasov-type.
To describe the prelimit systems, let XNi (t) denote the state of player i
at time t in the N -player game, and denote by ui(t) the control action that
he or she chooses at time t. Individual states will be elements of Rd, while
control actions will be elements of some closed set Γ ⊂ Rd2 . The evolution
of the individual states is then described by the Itô stochastic differential
equations
(1.1) dXNi (t) = b
(
t,XNi (t), µ
N (t), ui(t)
)
dt+ σ
(
t,XNi (t), µ
N (t)
)
dWNi (t),
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, where WN1 , . . . ,WNN are independent standard Wiener pro-
cesses, and µN (t) is the empirical measure of the system at time t:
µN (t)
.
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δXNi (t)
.
Notice that the coefficients b, σ in Eq. (1.1) are the same for all players. We
will assume b, σ to be continuous in the time variable, Lipschitz continuous
in the state and measure variable, where we use the square Wasserstein
metric as a distance on probability measures, and of sub-linear growth. The
dispersion coefficient σ does not depend on the control variable, but it may
depend on the measure-variable. Moreover, σ is allowed to be degenerate.
Deterministic systems are thus covered as a special case.
The individual dynamics are explicitly coupled only through the empiri-
cal measure process µN . There is also an implicit coupling, namely through
the strategies u1, . . . , uN , which may depend on non-local information; in
particular, a strategy ui might depend, in a non-anticipative way, on X
N
j or
WNj for j 6= i. In this paper, strategies will always be stochastic open-loop.
In particular, strategies will be processes adapted to a filtration that rep-
resents the information available to the players. We consider two types of
information: full information, which is the same for all players and is repre-
sented by a filtration at least as big as the one generated by the initial states
and the Wiener processes, and local information, which is player-dependent
and, for player i, is represented by the filtration generated by his/her own
initial state and the Wiener process WNi .
Let u = (u1, . . . , uN ) be a strategy vector, i.e., an N -vector of Γ-valued
processes such that ui is a strategy for player i, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Player i
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evaluates the effect of the strategy vector u according to the cost functional
JNi (u)
.
= E
[∫ T
0
f
(
s,XNi (s), µ
N (s), ui(s)
)
ds+ F
(
XNi (T ), µ
N (T )
)]
,
where T > 0 is the finite time horizon, (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ) the solution of the
system (1.1) under u, and µN the corresponding empirical measure process.
The cost coefficients f , F , which quantify running and terminal costs, respec-
tively, are assumed to be continuous in the time and control variable, locally
Lipschitz continuous in the state and measure variable, and of sub-quadratic
growth. The action space Γ is assumed to be closed, but not necessarily
compact; in the non-compact case, f will be quadratically coercive in the
control. The assumptions on the coefficients are chosen so that they cover
some linear-quadratic problems, in addition to many genuinely non-linear
problems.
If there were no control in Eq. (1.1) (i.e., b independent of the control
variable) and if the initial states for the N -player games were independent
and identically distributed with common distribution not depending on N ,
then (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ) would be exchangeable for every N ∈ N and, under our
assumptions on b, σ, the sequence (µN ) of empirical measure processes would
converge to some deterministic flow of probability measures:
µN (t)
N→∞−→ m(t), in distribution / probability.
This convergence would also hold for the sequence of path-space empiri-
cal measures, which, by symmetry and the Tanaka-Sznitman theorem, is
equivalent to the propagation of chaos property for the triangular array
(XNi )i∈{1,...,N},N∈N. In particular, Law(X
N
i (t)) → m(t) as N → ∞ for
each fixed index i, and m would be the flow of laws for the uncontrolled
McKean-Vlasov equation
dX(t) = b
(
t,X(t),m(t)
)
dt+ σ
(
t,X(t),m(t)
)
dW (t), m(t) = Law(X(t)).
The above equation would determine the flow of measures m.
Now, for N ∈ N, let uN be a strategy vector for the N -player game.
For the sake of argument, let us suppose that uN = (uN1 , . . . , u
N
N ) is a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium for each N (symmetric in the sense that the finite
sequence ((XN1 (0), u
N
1 ,W
N
1 ), . . . , (X
N
N (0), u
N
N ,W
N
N )) is exchangeable). If the
mean field heuristic applies, then the associated sequence of empirical mea-
sure processes (µN )N∈N converges in distribution to some deterministic flow
of probability measures m. In this case, m should be the flow of measures
induced by the solution of the controlled equation
(1.2) dX(t) = b
(
t,X(t),m(t), u(t))
)
dt+ σ
(
t,X(t),m(t))
)
dW (t),
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where the control process u should, by the Nash equilibrium property of the
N -player strategies, be optimal for the control problem
minimize Jm (v)
.
= E
[∫ T
0
f (s,X(s),m(t), v(s)) ds + F (X(T ),m(T ))
]
over all admissible v subject to: X solves Eq. (1.2) under v.
(1.3)
The mean field game, which is the limit system for the N -player games,
can now be described as follows: For each flow of measures m, solve the opti-
mal control problem (1.3) to find an optimal control um with corresponding
state process Xm. Then choose a flow of measures m according to the mean
field condition m(·) = Law(Xm(·)). This yields a solution of the mean field
game, which can be identified with the pair (Law(Xm, um,W ),m); see Def-
inition 4.3 below. We include the driving noise process W in the definition
of the solution, as it is the joint distribution of initial condition, control pro-
cess and noise process that determines the law of a solution to Eq. (1.2).
If (Law(Xm, um,W ),m) is a solution of the mean field game, then, thanks
to the mean field condition, Xm is a McKean-Vlasov solution of the con-
trolled equation (1.2); moreover, Xm is an optimally controlled process for
the standard optimal control problem (1.3) with cost functional Jm. Clearly,
neither existence nor uniqueness of solutions of the mean field game are a
priori guaranteed.
In order to connect sequences of Nash equilibria with solutions of the
mean field game in a rigorous way, we associate strategy vectors for the N -
player games with normalized occupation measures or path-space empirical
measures; see Eq. (5.1) in Section 5 below. Those occupation measures
are random variables with values in the space of probability measures on
an extended canonical space Z .= X × R2 × W, where X , W are path
spaces for the individual state processes and the driving Wiener processes,
respectively, and R2 is a space of Γ-valued relaxed controls. Observe that
Z contains a component for the trajectories of the driving noise process.
Let (uN ) be a sequence such that, for each N ∈ N, uN is a strategy vector
for the N -player game (not necessarily a Nash equilibrium). Let (QN ) be
the associated normalized occupation measures; thus, QN is the empirical
measure of ((XN1 , u
N
1 ,W
N
1 ), . . . , (X
N
N , u
N
N ,W
N
N )) seen as a random element
of P(Z). We then show the following:
1. The family (QN )N∈N is pre-compact under a mild uniform integrability
condition on strategies and initial states; see Lemma 5.1.
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2. Any limit random variableQ of (QN ) takes values in the set of McKean-
Vlasov solutions of Eq. (1.2) with probability one; see Lemma 5.3.
3. Suppose that (uN ) is a sequence of local approximate Nash equilibria
(cf. Definition 3.1). If Q is a limit point of (QN ) such that the flow
of measures induced by Q is deterministic with probability one, then
Q takes values in the set of solutions of the mean field game with
probability one; see Theorem 5.1.
The hypothesis in Point 3 above that the flow of measures induced by
Q is deterministic with probability one means that the corresponding subse-
quence of (µN ), the empirical measure processes, converges in distribution to
a deterministic flow of probability measures m. This is a strong hypothesis,
essentially part of the mean field heuristic; nonetheless, it is satisfied if uN
is a vector of independent and identically distributed individual strategies
for each N , where the common distribution is allowed to vary with N ; see
Corollary 5.2. While Nash equilibria for the N -player games with indepen-
dent and identically distributed individual strategies do not exist in general,
local approximate Nash equilibria with i.i.d. components do exist, at least
under the additional assumption of compact action space Γ and bounded
coefficients; see Proposition 3.1. In this situation, the passage to the mean
field game limit is justified.
For the passage to the limit required by Point 2 above, we have to iden-
tify solutions of Eq. (1.2), which describes the controlled dynamics of the
limit system. To this end, we employ a local martingale problem in the
spirit of Stroock and Varadhan [1979]. The use of martingale problems, to-
gether with weak convergence methods, has a long tradition in the analysis
of McKean-Vlasov limits for uncontrolled weakly interacting systems [for
instance, Funaki, 1984, Oelschläger, 1984] as well as in the study of stochas-
tic optimal control problems. Controlled martingale problems are especially
powerful in combination with relaxed controls; see El Karoui et al. [1987],
Kushner [1990], and the references therein. In the context of mean field
games, a martingale problem formulation has been used by Carmona and Lacker
[2015] to establish existence and uniqueness results for non-degenerate sys-
tems and, more recently, by Lacker [2015a], where existence of solutions
is established for mean field games of the type studied here; the assump-
tions on the coefficients are rather mild, allowing for degenerate as well as
control-dependent diffusion coefficient. The notion of solution we give in
Definition 4.3 below corresponds to the notion of “relaxed mean field game
solution” introduced in Lacker [2015a].
The martingale problem formulation for the controlled limit dynam-
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ics we use here is actually adapted from the joint work Budhiraja et al.
[2012], where we studied large deviations for weakly interacting Itô pro-
cesses through weak convergence methods. While the passage to the limit
needed there for obtaining convergence of certain Laplace functionals is anal-
ogous to the convergence result of Point 2 above, the limit problems in
Budhiraja et al. [2012] are not mean field games; they are, in fact, optimal
control problems of McKean-Vlasov type, albeit with a particular structure.
As a consequence, optimality has to be verified in a different way: In order to
establish Point 3 above, we construct an asymptotically approximately op-
timal competitor strategy in noise feedback form (i.e., as a function of time,
initial condition, and the trajectory of the player’s noise process up to current
time), which is then applied to exactly one of the N players for each N ; this
yields optimality of the limit points thanks to the Nash equilibrium property
of the prelimit strategies. If the limit problem were of McKean-Vlasov type,
one would use a strategy selected according to a different optimality criterion
and apply it to all components (or players) of the prelimit systems.
In the work by Lacker [2015b] mentioned in the second paragraph, limit
points of normalized occupation measures associated with a sequence of N -
player Nash equilibria are shown to be concentrated on solutions of the cor-
responding mean field game even if the induced limit flow of measures is
stochastic (in contrast to Point 3 above). This characterization is estab-
lished for mean field systems over a finite time horizon as here, but possibly
with a common noise (represented as an additional independent Wiener pro-
cess common to all players). There as here, Nash equilibria are considered in
stochastic open-loop strategies, and the methods of proof are similar to ours.
The characterization of limit points in Lacker [2015b] relies, even in the situ-
ation without common noise studied here, on a new notion of solution of the
mean field game (“weak MFG solution”) that applies to probability measures
on an extended canonical space (extended with respect to our Z to keep track
of the possibly stochastic flow of measures). In terms of that notion of so-
lution a complete characterization of limit points is achieved. In particular,
the assumption in Point 3 that the flow of measures induced by Q is deter-
ministic can be removed. However, if that assumption is dropped, then the
claim that Q takes values in the set of solutions of the mean field game with
probability one will in general be false. A counterexample illustrating this
fact can be deduced from the discussion of subsection 3.3 in Lacker [2015b].
The notion of “weak MFG solution” is indeed strictly weaker than what one
obtains by randomization of the usual notion of solution (“strong” solution
with probability one), and this is what makes the complete characterization
of Nash limit points possible.
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The rest of this work is organized as follows. Notation, basic objects as
well as the standing assumptions on the coefficients b, σ, f , F are intro-
duced in Section 2. Section 3 contains a precise description of the N -player
games. Nash equilibria are defined and an existence result for certain local
approximate Nash equilibria is given; see Proposition 3.1. In Section 4, the
limit dynamics for the N -player games are introduced. The corresponding
notions of McKean-Vlasov solution and solution of the mean field game are
defined and discussed. An approximation result in terms of noise feedback
strategies, needed in the construction of competitor strategies, is given in
Lemma 4.3. In Section 5, the convergence analysis is carried out, leading to
Theorem 5.1 and its Corollary 5.2, which are our main results. Existence of
solutions of the mean field game falls out as a by-product of the analysis.
2 Preliminaries and assumptions
Let d, d1, d2 ∈ N, which will be the dimensions of the space of private states,
noise values, and control actions, respectively. Choose T > 0, the finite time
horizon. Set
X .= C([0, T ],Rd), W .= C([0, T ],Rd1),
and, as usual, equip X , W with the topology of uniform convergence, which
turns them into Polish spaces. Let ‖ · ‖X , ‖ · ‖W denote the supremum norm
on X and W, respectively. The spaces Rn with n ∈ N are equipped with the
standard Euclidean norm, always indicated by |.|.
For S a Polish space, let P(S) denote the space of probability measures
on B(S), the Borel sets of S. For s ∈ S, let δs indicate the Dirac measure
concentrated in s. Equip P(S) with the topology of weak convergence of
probability measures. Then P(S) is again a Polish space. Let dS be a
metric compatible with the topology of S such that (S,dS) is a complete
and separable metric space. A metric that turns P(S) into a complete and
separable metric space is then given by the bounded Lipschitz metric
dP(S)(ν, ν˜)
.
= sup
{∫
S
g dν −
∫
S
g dν˜ : g : S → R such that ‖g‖bLip ≤ 1
}
,
where
‖g‖bLip .= sup
s∈S
|g(s)| + sup
s,s˜∈S:s 6=s˜
|g(s)− g(s˜)|
dS(s, s˜)
.
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Given a complete compatible metric dS on S, we also consider the space
of probability measures on B(S) with finite second moments:
P2(S) .=
{
ν ∈ P(S) : ∃s0 ∈ S :
∫
S
dS(s, s0)
2 ν(ds) <∞
}
.
Notice that
∫
dS(s, s0)
2ν(ds) <∞ for some s0 ∈ S implies that the integral
is finite for every s0 ∈ S. The topology of weak convergence of measures
plus convergence of second moments turns P2(S) into a Polish space. A
compatible complete metric is given by
dP2(S)(ν, ν˜)
.
=
(
inf
α∈P(S×S):[α]1=ν and [α]2=ν˜
∫
S×S
dS(s, s˜)
2 α(ds, ds˜)
)1/2
,
where [α]1 ([α]2) denotes the first (second) marginal of α; dP2(S) is often
referred to as the square Wasserstein (or Vasershtein) metric. An immediate
consequence of the definition of dP2(S) is the following observation: for all
N ∈ N, s1, . . . , sN , s˜1, . . . , s˜N ∈ S,
(2.1) dP2(S)
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
δsi ,
1
N
N∑
i=1
δs˜i
)
≤
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
dS
(
si, s˜i
)2
.
The bounded Lipschitz metric and the square Wasserstein metric on P(S)
and P2(S), respectively, depend on the choice of the metric dS on the un-
derlying space S. This dependence will be clear from context. If S = Rd
with the metric induced by Euclidean norm, we may write d2 to indicate the
square Wasserstein metric dP2(Rd).
Let M, M2 denote the spaces of continuous functions on [0, T ] with
values in P(Rd) and P2(Rd), respectively:
M .= C([0, T ],P(Rd)), M2 .= C([0, T ],P2(Rd)).
Let Γ be a closed subset of Rd2 , the set of control actions, or action
space. Given a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and a filtration (Ft) in F , let
H2((Ft),P; Γ) denote the space of all Γ-valued (Ft)-progressively measurable
processes u such that E
[∫ T
0 |u(t)|2dt
]
<∞. The elements of H2((Ft),P; Γ)
might be referred to as (individual) strategies.
Denote by R the space of all deterministic relaxed controls on Γ× [0, T ],
that is,
R .= {r : r positive measure on B(Γ× [0, T ]) : r(Γ× [0, t]) = t ∀t ∈ [0, T ]} .
If r ∈ R and B ∈ B(Γ), then the mapping [0, T ] ∋ t 7→ r(B × [0, t]) is
absolutely continuous, hence differentiable almost everywhere. Since B(Γ) is
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countably generated, the time derivative of r exists almost everywhere and
is a measurable mapping r˙t : [0, T ] → P(Γ) such that r(dy, dt) = r˙t(dy)dt.
Denote by R2 the space of deterministic relaxed controls with finite second
moments:
R2 .=
{
r ∈ R :
∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|y|2 r(dy, dt) <∞
}
.
By definition, R2 ⊂ R. The topology of weak convergence of measures turns
R into a Polish space (not compact unless Γ is bounded). Equip R2 with
the topology of weak convergence of measures plus convergence of second
moments, which makes R2 a Polish space, too.
Any Γ-valued process v defined on some probability space (Ω,F ,P) in-
duces an R-valued random variable ρ according to
(2.2) ρω
(
B × I) .= ∫
I
δv(t,ω)(B)dt, B ∈ B(Γ), I ∈ B([0, T ]), ω ∈ Ω.
If v is such that
∫ T
0 |v(t)|2dt <∞ P-almost surely, then the induced random
variable ρ takes values inR2 P-almost surely. If v is progressively measurable
with respect to a filtration (Ft) in F , then ρ is adapted in the sense that the
mapping t 7→ ρ(B × [0, t]) is (Ft)-adapted for every B ∈ B(Γ) [cf. Kushner,
1990, Section 3.3]. More generally, an R-valued random variable ρ defined
on some probability space (Ω,F ,P) is called adapted to a filtration (Ft) in
F if the process t 7→ ρ(B × [0, t]) is (Ft)-adapted for every B ∈ B(Γ).
Below, we will make use of the following canonical space. Set
Z .= X ×R2 ×W,
and endow Z with the product topology, which makes it a Polish space. Let
dR2 be a complete metric compatible with the topology of R2. Set
dZ ((ϕ, r, w), (ϕ˜, r˜, w˜))
.
= ‖ϕ− ϕ˜‖X + dR2(r, r˜)
1 + dR2(r, r˜)
+
‖w − w˜‖W
1 + ‖w − w˜‖W ,
where (ϕ, r, w), (ϕ˜, r˜, w˜) are elements of Z written component-wise. This
defines a complete metric compatible with the topology of Z. Let dP2(Z) be
the square Wasserstein metric on P2(Z) induced by dZ . Since dZ is bounded
with respect to the second and third component of Z, the condition of finite
second moment is a restriction only on the first marginal of the probability
measures on B(Z). Let us indicate by dP(P2(Z)) the bounded Lipschitz metric
on P(P2(Z)) induced by dP2(Z). Denote by (Xˆ, ρˆ, Wˆ ) the coordinate process
on Z:
Xˆ(t, (ϕ, r, w))
.
= ϕ(t), ρˆ(t, (ϕ, r, w))
.
= r|B(Γ×[0,t]), Wˆ (t, (ϕ, r, w))
.
= w(t).
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Let (Gt) be the canonical filtration in B(Z), that is,
Gt .= σ
(
(Xˆ, ρˆ, Wˆ )(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Let b denote the drift coefficient and σ the dispersion coefficient of the
dynamics, and let f , F quantify the running costs and terminal costs, re-
spectively; we take
b : [0, T ]× Rd × P2(Rd)× Γ→ Rd, σ : [0, T ]× Rd × P2(Rd)→ Rd×d1 ,
f : [0, T ] × Rd × P2(Rd)× Γ→ [0,∞), F : Rd × P2(Rd)→ [0,∞).
Notice that the dispersion coefficient σ does not depend on the control vari-
able and that the cost coefficients f , F are non-negative functions. We make
the following assumptions, where K, L are some finite positive constants:
(A1) Measurability and continuity in time and control: b, σ, f , F are Borel
measurable and such that, for all (x, ν) ∈ Rd × P2(Rd), b(·, x, ν, ·),
σ(·, x, ν), f(·, x, ν, ·) are continuous, uniformly over compact subsets of
R
d × P2(Rd).
(A2) Lipschitz continuity of b, σ: for all x, x˜ ∈ Rd, ν, ν˜ ∈ P2(Rd),
sup
t∈[0,T ]
sup
γ∈Γ
{|b(t, x, ν, γ) − b(t, x˜, ν˜, γ)| ∨ |σ(t, x, ν) − σ(t, x˜, ν˜)|}
≤ L (|x− x˜|+ d2(ν, ν˜)) .
(A3) Sublinear growth of b, σ: for all x ∈ Rd, ν ∈ P2(Rd), γ ∈ Γ,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|b(t, x, ν, γ)| ≤ K
(
1 + |x|+ |γ|+
√∫
|y|2ν(dy)
)
,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|σ(t, x, ν)| ≤ K
(
1 + |x|+
√∫
|y|2ν(dy)
)
.
(A4) Local Lipschitz continuity of f , F : for all x, x˜ ∈ Rd, ν, ν˜ ∈ P2(Rd)
sup
t∈[0,T ]
sup
γ∈Γ
{|f(t, x, ν, γ)− f(t, x˜, ν˜, γ)| + |F (x, ν)− F (x˜, ν˜)|}
≤ L (|x− x˜|+ d2(ν, ν˜))
(
1 + |x|+ |x˜|+
√∫
|y|2ν(dy) +
√∫
|y|2ν˜(dy)
)
.
(A5) Subquadratic growth of f , F : for all x ∈ Rd, ν ∈ P2(Rd), γ ∈ Γ,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
{|f(t, x, ν, γ)| ∨ |F (x, ν)|} ≤ K
(
1 + |x|2 + |γ|2 +
∫
|y|2ν(dy)
)
.
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(A6) Action space and coercivity: Γ ⊂ Rd2 is closed, and there exist c0 > 0
and Γ0 ⊂ Γ such that Γ0 is compact and for every γ ∈ Γ \ Γ0
inf
(t,x,ν)∈[0,T ]×Rd×P2(Rd)
f(t, x, ν, γ) ≥ c0|γ|2.
3 N-player games
Let N ∈ N. Let (ΩN ,FN ,PN ) be a complete probability space equipped
with a filtration (FNt ) in FN that satisfies the usual hypotheses and carrying
N independent d1-dimensional (FNt )-Wiener processes WN1 , . . . ,WNN . For
each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, choose a random variable ξNi ∈ L2(ΩN ,FN0 ,PN ;Rd),
the initial state of player i in the prelimit game with N players. In ad-
dition, we assume that the stochastic basis is rich enough to carry a se-
quence (ϑNi )i∈{1,...,N} of independent random variables with values in the in-
terval [0, 1] such that each ϑNi is FN0 -measurable and uniformly distributed
on [0, 1], and (ϑNi )i∈{1,...,N} is independent of the σ-algebra generated by
ξN1 , . . . , ξ
N
N and the Wiener processes W
N
1 , . . . ,W
N
N . The random variables
ϑNi , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, are a technical device which we may use without loss of
generality; see Remark 3.2 below.
A vector of individual strategies, that is, a vector u = (u1, . . . , uN ) such
that u1, . . . , uN ∈ H2((FNt ),PN ; Γ), is called a strategy vector. Given a
strategy vector u = (u1, . . . , uN ), consider the system of Itô stochastic inte-
gral equations
XNi (t) = ξ
N
i +
∫ t
0
b
(
s,XNi (s), µ
N (s), ui(s)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
σ
(
s,XNi (s), µ
N (s)
)
dWNi (s), t ∈ [0, T ],
(3.1)
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, where µN (s) is the empirical measure of the processes
XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N at time s ∈ [0, T ], that is,
µNω (s)
.
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXNj (s,ω)
, ω ∈ ΩN .
The process XNi describes the evolution of the private state of player i if
he/she uses strategy ui while the other players use strategies uj , j 6= i.
Thanks to assumptions (A2) and (A3), the system of equations (3.1) pos-
sesses a unique solution in the following sense: given any strategy vector
u = (u1, . . . , uN ), there exists a vector (X
N
1 , . . . ,X
N
N ) of continuous R
d-
valued (FNt )-adapted processes such that (3.1) holds PN -almost surely, and
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(XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ) is unique (up to PN -indistinguishability) among all continu-
ous (FNt )-adapted solutions.
The following estimates on the controlled state process and the associated
empirical measure process will be useful in Section 5.
Lemma 3.1. There exists a finite constant CT,K depending on T , K, but not
on N , such that if uN = (uN1 , . . . , u
N
N ) is a strategy vector for the N -player
game and (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ) the solution of the system (3.1) under u
N , then
sup
t∈[0,T ]
EN
[|XNi (t)|2]
≤ CT,K
(
1 +EN
[|ξNi |2]+EN
[∫ T
0
(
d2
(
µN (t), δ0
)2
+ |uNi (t)|2
)
dt
])
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and
sup
t∈[0,T ]
EN
[
d2
(
µN (t), δ0
)2] ≤ sup
t∈[0,T ]
EN

 1
N
N∑
j=1
|XNj (t)|2


≤ CT,K

1 + 1
N
N∑
j=1
EN
[
|ξNj |2 +
∫ T
0
|uNj (t)|2dt
] .
Proof. By Jensen’s inequality, Hölder’s inequality, Itô’s isometry, assump-
tion (A3), and the Fubini-Tonelli theorem, we have for every t ∈ [0, T ],
EN
[|XNi (t)|2] ≤ 3EN [|ξNi |2]+ 12(T + 1)K2
∫ t
0
EN
[|XNi (s)|2] ds
+ 12(T + 1)K2EN
[∫ T
0
(
1 + d2
(
µN (s), δ0
)2
+ |uNi (s)|2
)
ds
]
,
and the first estimate follows by Gronwall’s lemma.
By definition of the square Wasserstein metric d2, we have for every
t ∈ [0, T ], every ω ∈ ΩN ,
d2
(
µNω (t), δ0
)2
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
|XNj (t, ω)|2.
Thus, using again assumption (A3) and the same inequalities as above, we
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have for every t ∈ [0, T ],
EN

 1
N
N∑
j=1
|XNj (t)|2


≤ 3EN

 1
N
N∑
j=1
|ξNj |2

+ 12(T + 1)K2 ∫ T
0
EN

1 + 1
N
N∑
j=1
|uNj (s)|2

 ds
+ 24(T + 1)K2
∫ t
0
EN

 1
N
N∑
j=1
|XNj (s)|2

 ds,
and we conclude again by Gronwall’s lemma. The constant CT,K for both es-
timates need not be greater than 12(T∨1)(T+1)(K∨1)2 exp (24(T+1)K2T ).
Lemma 3.2. Let p ≥ 2. Then there exists a finite constant C˜p,T,K,d depend-
ing on p, T , K, d, but not on N such that if uN = (uN1 , . . . , u
N
N ) is a strategy
vector for the N -player game and (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ) the solution of the system
(3.1) under uN , then
EN
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
d2
(
µN (t), δ0
)p] ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[‖XNi ‖pX ]
≤ C˜p,T,K,d
(
1 +
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
|ξNi |p +
∫ T
0
|uNi (t)|pdt
])
.
Proof. The inequality
EN
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
d2
(
µN (t), δ0
)p] ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[‖XNi ‖pX ]
follows by (2.1) and Jensen’s inequality. In verifying the second part of the
assertion, we may assume that
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
|ξNi |p +
∫ T
0
|uNi (t)|pdt
]
<∞.
By Jensen’s inequality, Hölder’s inequality, (A3), the Fubini-Tonelli theorem,
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and the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequalities, we have for every t ∈ [0, T ],
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
|XNi (s)|p
]
≤ Cˆp,T,K,d
(
1 +
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
|ξNi |p +
∫ T
0
|uNi (s)|pds
])
+ 2Cˆp,T,K,d
∫ t
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
sup
s∈[0,s˜]
|XNi (s)|p
]
ds˜,
where Cˆp,T,K,d
.
= 12p−1(T ∨ 1)p(K ∨ 1)p(1 + Cˆp,d) and Cˆp,d, which depends
only on p and d, is the finite “universal” constant from the Burkholder-
Davis-Gundy inequalities [for instance, Theorem 3.3.28 and Remark 3.3.30 in
Karatzas and Shreve, 1991, pp. 166-167]. The assertion now follows thanks
to Gronwall’s lemma.
Player i evaluates a strategy vector u = (u1, . . . , uN ) according to the
cost functional
JNi (u)
.
= EN
[∫ T
0
f
(
s,XNi (s), µ
N (s), ui(s)
)
ds+ F
(
XNi (T ), µ
N (T )
)]
,
where (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ) is the solution of the system (3.1) under u and µ
N is
the empirical measure process induced by (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ).
Given a strategy vector u = (u1, . . . , uN ) and an individual strategy
v ∈ H2((FNt ),PN ; Γ), let [u−i, v] .= (u1, . . . , ui−1, v, ui+1, . . . , uN ) indicate
the strategy vector that is obtained from u by replacing ui, the strategy of
player i, with v. Let (FN,it ) denote the filtration generated by ϑNi , ξNi , and
the Wiener process WNi , that is,
FN,it .= σ
(
ϑNi , ξ
N
i ,W
N
i (s) : s ∈ [0, t]
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
The filtration (FN,it ) represents the local information available to player i.
Clearly, (FN,it ) ⊂ FNt and H2((FN,it ),PN ; Γ) ⊂ H2((FNt ),PN ; Γ). We may
refer to the elements of H2((FN,it ),PN ; Γ) as narrow strategies or narrow
individual strategies for player i.
Definition 3.1. Let ε ≥ 0, u1, . . . , uN ∈ H2((FNt ),PN ; Γ). The strategy
vector u
.
= (u1, . . . , uN ) is called a local ε-Nash equilibrium for the N -player
game if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, every v ∈ H2((FN,it ),PN ; Γ),
(3.2) JNi (u) ≤ JNi
(
[u−i, v]
)
+ ε.
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If inequality (3.2) holds for all v ∈ H2((FNt ),PN ; Γ), then u is called an
ε-Nash equilibrium.
If u is a (local) ε-Nash equilibrium with ε = 0, then u is called a (local)
Nash equilibrium.
Remark 3.1. In Definition 3.1, Nash equilibria are defined with respect to
stochastic open-loop strategies. This is the same notion as the one used in
the probabilistic approach to mean field games; see Carmona and Delarue
[2013]. A Nash equilibrium in stochastic open-loop strategies may be induced
by a Markov feedback strategy (or a more general closed-loop strategy); still,
it need not correspond to a Nash equilibrium in feedback strategies. Given a
vector of feedback strategies, varying the strategy of exactly one player means
that the feedback functions defining the strategies of the other players are
kept frozen. Since in general the state processes of the other players depend
on the state process of the deviating player (namely, through the empirical
measure of the system), the strategies of the other players seen as control
processes may change when one player deviates. This is in contrast with the
stochastic open-loop formulation where the control processes of the other
players are frozen when one player varies her/his strategy. Now, suppose
we had a Nash equilibrium in Markov feedback strategies for the N -player
game. If the feedback functions defining that Nash equilibrium depend only
on time, the current individual state, and the current empirical measure, and
if they are regular in the sense of being Lipschitz continuous, then they will
induce an εN -Nash equilibrium in stochastic open-loop strategies with εN
also depending on the Lipschitz constants of the feedback functions. Here,
we do not address the question of when Nash equilibria in regular feedback
strategies exist nor of how their Lipschitz constants would depend on the
number of players N . Neither do we address the more general question of
convergence of N -player Nash equilibria in feedback strategies, regular or
not. That difficult problem was posed in Lasry and Lions [2006b, 2007] and
is beyond the scope of this work.
Remark 3.2. The random variables ϑNi appearing in the definition of the
local information filtrations (FN,it ) are a technical device for randomization.
They will be used in the sequel only in two places, namely in the proof of
Proposition 3.1 on existence of local ε-Nash equilibria, where they allow to
pass from optimal relaxed controls to nearly optimal ordinary controls, and
in the proof of Lemma 5.2, where they serve to generate a coupling of ini-
tial conditions. The presence of the random variables ϑNi causes no loss of
generality in the following sense. Suppose that u
.
= (u1, . . . , uN ) is a strat-
egy vector adapted to the filtration generated by ξN1 , . . . , ξ
N
N and the Wiener
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processes WN1 , . . . ,W
N
N such that, for some ε ≥ 0, every i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
inequality (3.2) holds for all individual strategies v that are adapted to the
filtration generated by ξNi and the Wiener process W
N
i . Then inequality
(3.2) holds for all v ∈ H2((FN,it ),PN ; Γ); hence u is a local ε-Nash equi-
librium. To check this, take conditional expectation with respect to ϑNi
inside the expectation defining the cost functional JNi and use the indepen-
dence of ϑNi from the σ-algebra generated by ξ
N
1 , . . . , ξ
N
N and W
N
1 , . . . ,W
N
N .
An analogous reasoning applies to the situation of non-local (approximate)
Nash equilibria provided the strategy vector u is independent of the family
(ϑNi )i∈{1,...,N}.
By Definition 3.1, an ε-Nash equilibrium is also a local ε-Nash equilib-
rium. Observe that the individual strategies of a local ε-Nash equilibrium are
adapted to the full filtration (FNt ); only the competitor strategies in the ver-
ification of the local equilibrium property have to be narrow strategies, that
is, strategies adapted to one of the smaller filtrations (FN,1t ), . . . , (FN,Nt ).
If ξN1 , . . . , ξ
N
N are independent and u = (u1, . . . , uN ) is a vector of nar-
row strategies, that is, ui ∈ H2((FN,it ),PN ; Γ) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, then
(ξN1 , u1,W
N
1 ), . . . , (ξ
N
N , uN ,W
N
N ), interpreted as R
d×R2×W-valued random
variables, are independent. This allows to deduce existence of local approx-
imate Nash equilibria through Fan’s fixed point theorem in a way similar to
that for one-shot games [cf. Appendix 8.1 in Cardaliaguet, 2013]. For sim-
plicity, we give the result for a compact action space, bounded coefficients
and in the fully symmetric situation. In the sequel, Proposition 3.1 will be
used only to provide an example of a situation in which all the hypotheses
of our main result can be easily verified.
Proposition 3.1. In addition to (A1) – (A6), assume that Γ is compact
and that b, σ, f , F are bounded. Suppose that ξN1 , . . . , ξ
N
N are independent
and identically distributed. Given any ε > 0, there exist narrow strategies
uεi ∈ H2((FN,it ),PN ; Γ), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, such that uε .= (uε1, . . . , uεN ) is a
local ε-Nash equilibrium for the N -player game and the random variables
(ξN1 , u
ε
1,W
N
1 ), . . . , (ξ
N
N , u
ε
N ,W
N
N ) are independent and identically distributed.
Proof. Since Γ is compact by hypothesis, we have R = R2 as topological
spaces, and P(R) is compact.
Let m0 denote the common distribution of the initial states ξ
N
1 , . . . , ξ
N
N ;
thus m0 ∈ P2(Rd). With a slight abuse of notation, let (Xˆ(0), ρ, Wˆ ) denote
the restriction to Rd×R×W of the canonical process on Z. Let (G˜t) indicate
the corresponding canonical filtration, that is, G˜t .= σ(Xˆ(0), ρ(s), Wˆ (s) : s ≤
t), t ∈ [0, T ]. Let Y be the space of all ν ∈ P(Rd×R×W) such that [ν]1 = m0
and Wˆ is a (G˜t)-Wiener process under ν (in particular, Wˆ (0) = 0 ν-almost
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surely). Then Y is a non-empty compact convex subset of P(Rd ×R×W),
which in turn is contained in a locally convex topological linear space (under
the topology of weak convergence of measures).
The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that there exists ν∗ ∈ Y
such that ⊗Nν∗ corresponds to a local Nash equilibrium in relaxed controls
on the canonical space ZN . In the second step, given any ε > 0, we use ν∗
to construct a local ε-Nash equilibrium for the N -player game.
First step. Let ν, ν¯ ∈ Y. Then there exists a unique Ψ(ν; ν¯) ∈ P2(ZN )
such that
Ψ(ν; ν¯) = P ◦ (X,ρ,W )−1 ,
where W = (W1, . . . ,WN ) is a vector of independent d1-dimensional (Ft)-
adapted Wiener processes defined on some stochastic basis ((Ω,F ,P), (Ft))
satisfying the usual hypotheses and carrying a vector ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) of
(Ft)-adapted R-valued random variables such that
P ◦ (X(0),ρ,W )−1 = ν ⊗N−1 ν¯,
and X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) is the vector of continuous R
d-valued (Ft)-adapted
processes determined through the system of equations
Xi(t) = Xi(0) +
∫
Γ×[0,t]
b

s,Xi(s), 1
N
N∑
j=1
δXNj (s)
, γ

 ρi(dγ, ds)
+
∫ t
0
σ

s,Xi(s), 1
N
N∑
j=1
δXNj (s)

 dWi(s), t ∈ [0, T ],
(3.3)
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, which is the relaxed version of (3.1). The mapping
(ν, ν¯) 7→ Ψ(ν; ν¯)
defines a continuous function Y ×Y → P2(ZN ). The continuity of Ψ can be
checked by using a martingale problem characterization of solutions to (3.3);
cf. El Karoui et al. [1987], Kushner [1990], and also Section 4 below. Define
a function J : Y × Y → [0,∞) by
J(ν; ν¯)
.
= EΨ(ν;ν¯)
[∫
Γ×[0,T ]
f
(
s, Xˆ1(s), µˆ(s), γ
)
dρˆ1(dγ, ds) + F
(
Xˆ1(T ), µˆ(T )
)]
,
where µˆ(s)
.
= 1N
∑N
j=1 δXˆj(s) and (Xˆ1, . . . , XˆN ), (ρˆ
1, . . . , ρˆN ) are components
of the canonical process on ZN with the obvious interpretation. Thanks to
18
the continuity of Ψ and the boundedness and continuity of f , F , we have
that J is a continuous mapping on Y ×Y. On the other hand, for any fixed
ν¯ ∈ Y, all ν, ν˜ ∈ Y, all λ ∈ [0, 1],
Ψ(λν + (1− λ)ν˜; ν¯) = λΨ(ν; ν¯) + (1− λ)Ψ(ν˜; ν¯),
J (λν + (1− λ)ν˜; ν¯) = λJ(ν; ν¯) + (1− λ)J(ν˜; ν¯).
Define a function χ : Y → B(Y) by
χ(ν¯)
.
=
{
ν ∈ Y : J(ν; ν¯) = min
ν˜∈Y
J(ν˜; ν¯)
}
.
Observe that χ(ν¯) is non-empty, compact and convex for every ν¯ ∈ Y. Thus,
χ is well-defined as a mapping from Y to K(Y), the set of all non-empty
compact convex subsets of Y. Moreover, χ is upper semicontinuous in the
sense that ν ∈ χ(ν¯) whenever (νn) ⊂ Y, (ν¯n) ⊂ Y are sequences such that
limn→∞ ν¯n = ν¯, limn→∞ νn = ν, and νn ∈ χ(ν¯n) for each n ∈ N (recall that
Y is metrizable). We are therefore in the situation of Theorem 1 in Fan
[1952], which guarantees the existence of a fixed point for χ, that is, there
exists ν∗ ∈ Y such that ν∗ ∈ χ(ν∗).
Second step. Let ε > 0, and let ν∗ ∈ Y be such that ν∗ ∈ χ(ν∗). Let
dY be a compatible metric on the compact Polish space Y, and define a
corresponding metric on Y×Y by dY×Y((ν, ν¯), (µ, µ¯)) .= dY(ν, µ)+dY(ν¯, µ¯).
Choose a stochastic basis ((Ω,F ,P), (Ft)) satisfying the usual hypotheses
and carrying a vector W = (W1, . . . ,WN ) of independent d1-dimensional
(Ft)-adapted Wiener processes, a vector ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) of (Ft)-adapted
R-valued random variables as well as a vector ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN ) of Rd-valued
F0-measurable random variables such that
P ◦ (ξ,ρ,W )−1 = ⊗Nν∗.
For i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, let (F◦,it ) be the filtration generated by ξi, ρi, Wi, that
is, F◦,it .= σ(ξi, ρi(s),Wi(s) : s ≤ t), t ∈ [0, T ]. By independence and a
version of the chattering lemma [for instance, Theorem 3.5.2 in Kushner,
1990, p. 59], for every δ > 0, there exists a vector ρδ = (ρδ,1, . . . , ρδ,N ) of
R-valued random variables such that:
(i) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ρδ,i is the relaxed control induced by a piece-
wise constant (F◦,it )-progressively measurable Γ-valued process;
(ii) the random variables (ξ1, ρ
δ,1,W1), . . . , (ξN , ρ
δ,N ,WN ) are independent
and identically distributed;
(iii) setting νδ
.
= P ◦(ξ1, ρδ,1,W1)−1, we have dY(νδ, ν∗) ≤ δ.
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Since J is continuous on the compact space Y×Y, it is uniformly continuous.
We can therefore find δ = δ(ε) > 0 such that
(3.4) |J(νδ; νδ)− J(ν∗; ν∗)|+max
ν∈Y
|J(ν; νδ)− J(ν; ν∗)| ≤ ε.
The law νδ (with δ = δ(ε)) and the corresponding product measure can
be reproduced on the stochastic basis of the N -player game. More precisely,
there exists a measurable function ψ : [0, T ]× [0, 1]×Rd×W → Γ such that,
upon setting
ui(t, ω)
.
= ψ
(
t, ϑNi (ω), ξ
N
i (ω),W
N
i (·, ω)
)
, (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ] ×ΩN ,
the following hold:
(i) ui ∈ H2((FN,it ),PN ; Γ) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N};
(ii) (ξN1 , u1,W
N
1 ), . . . , (ξ
N
N , uN ,WN ), interpreted as R
d×R×W-valued ran-
dom variables, are independent and identically distributed;
(iii) PN ◦(ξN1 , u1,WN1 )−1 = νδ.
The relaxed controls ρδ,1, . . . , ρδ,1 are, in fact, induced by Γ-valued processes
that may be taken to be piece-wise constant in time with respect to a com-
mon equidistant grid in [0, T ]. Existence of a function ψ with the desired
properties can therefore be established by iteration along the grid points, re-
peatedly invoking Theorem 6.10 in Kallenberg [2001, p. 112] on measurable
transfers; this procedure also yields progressive measurability of ψ.
Set u
.
= (u1, . . . , uN ) with ui ∈ H2((FN,it ),PN ; Γ) as above. Then
JN1 (u) = J(νδ; νδ).
Let v ∈ H2((FN,1t ),PN ; Γ), and set ν .= PN ◦(ξN1 , v,WN1 )−1, where v is
identified with its relaxed control. By independence and construction,
JN1
(
[u−1, v]
)
= J(ν; νδ).
Now, thanks to (3.4) and the equilibrium property of ν∗,
J(ν; νδ)− J(νδ; νδ)
= J(ν; νδ)− J(ν; ν∗) + J(ν∗; ν∗)− J(νδ; νδ) + J(ν; ν∗)− J(ν∗; ν∗)
≥ −ε.
It follows that
JN1 (u) ≤ JN1
(
[u−1, v]
)
+ ε for all v ∈ H2((FN,1t ),PN ; Γ).
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This establishes the local approximate equilibrium property of the strategy
vector u with respect to deviations in narrow strategies of player one. By
symmetry, the property also holds with respect to deviations of the other
players. We conclude that u is a local ε-Nash equilibrium.
4 Mean field games
In order to describe the limit system for the N -player games introduced
above, consider the stochastic integral equation
X(t) = X(0) +
∫ t
0
b
(
s,X(s),m(s), u(s)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
σ
(
s,X(s),m(s)
)
dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ],
(4.1)
where m ∈M2 is a flow of probability measures, W a d1-dimensional Wiener
process defined on some stochastic basis, and u a Γ-valued square-integrable
adapted process.
The notion of solution of the mean field game we introduce here makes
use of a version of Eq. (4.1) involving relaxed controls and varying stochastic
bases. Given a flow of measures m ∈ M2, consider the stochastic integral
equation
X(t) = X(0) +
∫
Γ×[0,t]
b
(
s,X(s),m(s), γ
)
ρ(dγ, ds)
+
∫ t
0
σ
(
s,X(s),m(s))
)
dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ].
(4.2)
A solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures m ∈ M2 is a quintuple
((Ω,F ,P), (Ft),X, ρ,W ) such that (Ω,F ,P) is a complete probability space,
(Ft) a filtration in F satisfying the usual hypotheses, W a d1-dimensional
(Ft)-Wiener process, ρ an R2-valued random variable adapted to (Ft), and
X an Rd-valued (Ft)-adapted continuous process satisfying Eq. (4.2) with
flow of measures m P-almost surely. Under our assumptions on b and σ,
existence and uniqueness of solutions hold for Eq. (4.2) given any flow of
measures m ∈ M2. Moreover, if ((Ω,F ,P), (Ft),X, ρ,W ) is a solution, then
the joint distribution of (X, ρ,W ) with respect to P can be identified with
a probability measure on B(Z). Conversely, the set of probability measures
Θ ∈ P(Z) that correspond to a solution of Eq. (4.2) with respect to some
stochastic basis carrying a d1-dimensional Wiener process can be character-
ized through a local martingale problem. To this end, for f ∈ C2(Rd×Rd1),
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m ∈ M2, define the process Mmf on (Z,B(Z)) by
Mmf
(
t, (ϕ, r, w)
) .
= f
(
ϕ(t), w(t)
) − f(ϕ(0), 0)
−
∫
Γ×[0,t]
Amγ,s(f)
(
ϕ(s), w(s)
)
r(dγ, ds), t ∈ [0, T ],(4.3)
where
Amγ,s(f)(x, y) .=
d∑
j=1
bj
(
s, x,m(s), γ
) ∂f
∂xj
(x, y)
+
1
2
d∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
(σσT)jk
(
s, x,m(s)
) ∂2f
∂xj∂xk
(x, y)
+
1
2
d1∑
l=1
∂2f
∂y2l
(x, y) +
d∑
k=1
d1∑
l=1
σkl
(
s, x,m(s)
) ∂2f
∂xk∂yl
(x, y).
(4.4)
Recall that (Gt) denotes the canonical filtration in B(Z) and (Xˆ, ρˆ, Wˆ ) the
coordinate process on Z. By construction,
Mmf (t) = f
(
Xˆ(t), Wˆ (t)
)−f(Xˆ(0), 0)−∫
Γ×[0,t]
Amγ,s(f)
(
Xˆ(s), Wˆ (s)
)
ρˆ(dγ, ds),
and Mmf is (Gt)-adapted.
Definition 4.1. A probability measure Θ ∈ P(Z) is called a solution of
Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures m if the following hold:
(i) m ∈ M2;
(ii) Wˆ (0) = 0 Θ-almost surely;
(iii) Mmf is a local martingale with respect to the filtration (Gt) and the
probability measure Θ for every f monomial of first or second order.
Remark 4.1. The test functions f in (iii) of Definition 4.1 are the functions
R
d × Rd1 → R given by (x, y) 7→ xj, (x, y) 7→ yl, (x, y) 7→ xj · xk, (x, y) 7→
yl · yl˜, and (x, y) 7→ xj · yl, where j, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, l, l˜ ∈ {1, . . . , d1}.
The following lemma justifies the terminology of Definition 4.1.
Lemma 4.1. Let m ∈ M2. If ((Ω,F ,P), (Ft),X, ρ,W ) is a solution of
Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures m, then Θ
.
= P ◦(X, ρ,W )−1 ∈ P(Z) is a
solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures m in the sense of Definition 4.1.
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Conversely, if Θ ∈ P(Z) is a solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures m
in the sense of Definition 4.1, then the quintuple ((Z,GΘ,Θ), (GΘt+), Xˆ, ρˆ, Wˆ )
is a solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures m, where GΘ is the Θ-
completion of G .= B(Z) and (GΘt+) the right-continuous version of the Θ-
augmentation of the canonical filtration (Gt).
Proof. The first part of the assertion is a consequence of Itô’s formula and
the local martingale property of the stochastic integral. The local martingale
property of Mmf clearly holds for any f ∈ C2(Rd × Rd1).
The proof of the second part is similar to the proof of Proposition 5.4.6
in Karatzas and Shreve [1991, pp. 315-316], though here we do not need to
extend the probability space; see Appendix A below.
A particular class of solutions of Eq. (4.2) in the sense of Definition 4.1
are those where the flow of measures m ∈ M2 is induced by the probability
measure Θ ∈ P(Z) in the sense that m(t) coincides with the law of Xˆ(t)
under Θ. We call those solutions McKean-Vlasov solutions:
Definition 4.2. A probability measure Θ ∈ P(Z) is called aMcKean-Vlasov
solution of Eq. (4.2) if there exists m ∈ M2 such that
(i) Θ is a solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures m;
(ii) Θ ◦ (Xˆ(t))−1 = m(t) for every t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 4.2. If Θ ∈ P2(Z), then the induced flow of measures is in M2.
More precisely, let Θ ∈ P2(Z) and set m(t) .= Θ ◦ (Xˆ(t))−1, t ∈ [0, T ]. By
definition of P2(Z) and the metric dZ ,
EΘ
[
‖Xˆ‖2X
]
=
∫
Z
‖ϕ‖2XΘ(dϕ, dr, dw) <∞.
This implies, in particular, that m(t) ∈ P2(Rd) for every t ∈ [0, T ]. By
construction and definition of the square Wasserstein metric, for all s, t ∈
[0, T ],
d2 (m(t),m(s))
2 ≤ EΘ
[
|Xˆ(t)− Xˆ(s)|2
]
.
Continuity of the trajectories of Xˆ and the dominated convergence theo-
rem with 2‖Xˆ‖2X as dominating Θ-integrable random variable imply that
d2 (m(t),m(s))→ 0 whenever |t− s| → 0. It follows that m ∈ M2.
Uniqueness holds not only for solutions of Eq. (4.2) with fixed flow of
measures m ∈ M2, but also for McKean-Vlasov solutions of Eq. (4.2).
Lemma 4.2. Let Θ, Θ˜ ∈ P2(Z). If Θ, Θ˜ are McKean-Vlasov solutions of
Eq. (4.2) such that Θ ◦ (Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ )−1 = Θ˜ ◦ (Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ )−1, then Θ = Θ˜.
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Proof. Let Θ, Θ˜ ∈ P2(Z) be McKean-Vlasov solutions of Eq. (4.2) such that
Θ ◦ (Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ )−1 = Θ˜ ◦ (Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ )−1. Set
m(t)
.
= Θ ◦ Xˆ(t)−1, m˜(t) .= Θ˜ ◦ Xˆ(t)−1, t ∈ [0, T ].
In view of Remark 4.2, we have m, m˜ ∈ M2. Define an extended canonical
space Z¯ by
Z¯ .= X × X ×R2 ×W.
Let (G¯)t≥0 denote the canonical filtration in G¯ .= B(Z¯), and let (X, X˜, ρˆ, Wˆ )
be the canonical process. A construction analogous to the one used in
the proof of Proposition 1 in Yamada and Watanabe [1971] (also see Sec-
tion 5.3.D in Karatzas and Shreve [1991]) yields a measure Q ∈ P(Z¯) such
that
Q ◦ (X, ρˆ, Wˆ )−1 = Θ, Q ◦ (X˜, ρˆ, Wˆ )−1 = Θ˜, Q
{
X(0) = X˜(0)
}
= 1.
By Lemma 4.1, ((Z¯, G¯Q, Q), (G¯Qt+),X, ρˆ, Wˆ ), ((Z¯ , G¯Q, Q), (G¯Qt+), X˜, ρˆ, Wˆ ) are
solutions of Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures m and m˜, respectively, where
G¯Q is the Q-completion of G¯ and (G¯Qt+) the right-continuous version of the
Q-augmentation of (G¯t).
By construction and definition of the square Wasserstein distance,
d2 (m(t), m˜(t))
2 ≤ EQ
[∣∣∣X(t) − X˜(t)∣∣∣2] for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Using (A2), Hölder’s inequality, Itô’s isometry, Fubini’s theorem and the fact
that X(0) = X˜(0) Q-almost surely, we find that for every t ∈ [0, T ],
EQ
[∣∣∣X(t)− X˜(t)∣∣∣2]
≤ 4(T + 1)L2
∫ t
0
EQ
[∣∣∣X(s)− X˜(s)∣∣∣2 + d2 (m(s), m˜(s))2
]
ds
≤ 8(T + 1)L2
∫ t
0
EQ
[∣∣∣X(s)− X˜(s)∣∣∣2] ds.
Gronwall’s lemma and the continuity of trajectories imply that X = X˜ Q-
almost surely and that m = m˜. It follows that Θ = Θ˜.
Define the costs associated with a flow of measures m ∈ M2, an initial
24
distribution ν ∈ P(Rd) and a probability measure Θ ∈ P(Z) by
Jˆ(ν,Θ;m)
.
=


EΘ
[∫
Γ×[0,T ] f
(
s, Xˆ(s),m(s), γ
)
ρˆ(dγ, ds) + F
(
Xˆ(T ),m(T )
)]
if Θ is a solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures m
and Θ ◦ Xˆ(0)−1 = ν,
∞ otherwise.
This defines a measurable mapping Jˆ : P(Rd)× P(Z) ×M2 → [0,∞]. The
corresponding value function Vˆ : P(Rd)×M2 → [0,∞] is given by
Vˆ (ν;m)
.
= inf
Θ∈P(Z)
Jˆ(ν,Θ;m).
Definition 4.3. A pair (Θ,m) is called a solution of the mean field game if
the following hold:
(i) m ∈ M2, Θ ∈ P(Z), and Θ is a solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of
measures m;
(ii) Mean field condition: Θ ◦ Xˆ(t)−1 = m(t) for every t ∈ [0, T ];
(iii) Optimality condition: Jˆ(m(0),Θ;m) ≤ Jˆ(m(0), Θ˜;m) for every Θ˜ ∈
P(Z).
In Definition 4.3, there is some redundancy in the choice of the pair (Θ,m)
as solution of the mean field game in that, thanks to the mean field condition,
the flow of measures m is completely determined by the probability measure
Θ. Consequently, we may call a probability measure Θ ∈ P(Z) a solution of
the mean field game if the pair (Θ,m) is a solution of the mean field game
in the sense of Definition 4.3 where m is the flow of measures induced by Θ,
that is, m(t)
.
= Θ ◦ Xˆ(t)−1, t ∈ [0, T ].
If Θ is a solution of the mean field game, then, again thanks to the mean
field condition, it is also a McKean-Vlasov solution of Eq. (4.2). In general,
however, Θ is not optimal as a controlled McKean-Vlasov solution. In the
optimality condition of Definition 4.3, in fact, the flow of measures is frozen
at the flow of measures induced by Θ, while in an optimization problem
of McKean-Vlasov type the flow of measures would have to vary with the
controlled solution.
Remark 4.3. The use of relaxed controls in Definition 4.3 has a twofold moti-
vation. The first is pragmatic and well known [for instance, El Karoui et al.,
1987, Kushner, 1990], namely the fact that relaxed controls allow one to
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embed the space of control processes into a nice topological space (if Γ is
compact, then R = R2 is compact; for unbounded Γ, R2 is still Polish)
without changing the minimal costs. In particular, existence of optimal con-
trols is guaranteed in the space of relaxed controls. The second motivation
is related to this fact, but more conceptual. The mean field condition in the
mean field game is required to hold for the law of the state process under an
optimal control only. Thus, existence of optimal controls (for a given flow
of measures) is crucial for the existence of solutions to the mean field game.
For ordinary optimal control problems, on the other hand, it suffices that
the minimal costs be well defined. Still, it is natural to ask for conditions
ensuring that a solution of the mean field game can be obtained in ordinary
control processes, not just in relaxed controls. Sufficient conditions of this
kind have been established in Lacker [2015a]. One simple sufficient condition
is that the dynamics be linear and the costs convex in the control.
The next lemma, the proof of which is based on time discretization and
dynamic programming, will be an essential ingredient in the construction of
competitor strategies in the proof of Theorem 5.1 below.
Lemma 4.3. Let m ∈ M2. Given any ε > 0, there exists a measurable
function ψmε : [0, T ] × Rd ×W → Γ such that the following hold:
(i) ψmε is progressively measurable in the sense that, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
every x ∈ Rd, we have ψmε (t, x, w) = ψmε (t, x, w˜) whenever w(s) = w˜(s)
for all s ∈ [0, t];
(ii) ψmε takes values in a finite subset of Γ;
(iii) Jˆ(m(0),Θmε ;m) ≤ Vˆ (m(0);m) + ε, where Θmε is the unique probability
measure in P2(Z) such that Θmε is a solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of
measures m, Θmε ◦ (Xˆ(0))−1 = m(0), and
ρˆ(dγ, dt) = δψmε (t,Xˆ(0),Wˆ )
(dγ) dt Θmε -almost surely.
Proof. Fix m ∈ M2, and set, for (t, x, γ) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × Γ,
bm(t, x, γ)
.
= b
(
t, x,m(t), γ
)
, σm(t, x)
.
= σ
(
t, x,m(t)
)
,
fm(t, x, γ)
.
= f
(
t, x,m(t), γ
)
, Fm(x)
.
= F
(
x,m(T )
)
.
Thanks to assumptions (A1), (A2), (A4), and the continuity of m, we have
that bm, σm, fm are continuous in the time and control variable, uniformly
over compact subsets of Rd, bm, σm are globally Lipschitz continuous in
the state variable, uniformly in the other variables, and fm, Fm are locally
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Lipschitz continuous in the state variable, uniformly in the other variables,
with local Lipschitz constants that grow sublinearly in the state variable.
The function ψmε will be constructed based on the principle of dynamic
programming applied in discrete time. To this end, we first introduce an
original control problem corresponding to the minimal costs Vˆ (·,m), then we
build a sequence of approximating optimal control problems by successively
restricting the set of admissible strategies. The proof proceeds in six steps.
First step. Let U be the set of all quadruples ((Ω,F ,P), (Ft), ρ,W ) such
that the pair ((Ω,F ,P), (Ft)) forms a stochastic basis satisfying the usual
hypotheses, W is a d1-dimensional (Ft)-Wiener process, and ρ is an (Ft)-
adapted R2-valued random variable such that E
[∫
Γ×[0,T ] |γ|2ρ(dγ, ds)
]
<
∞. For simplicity, we may write ρ ∈ U instead of ((Ω,F ,P), (Ft), ρ,W ) ∈ U .
Given any ρ ∈ U , (t0, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd, the stochastic integral equation
X(t) = x+
∫
Γ×[0,t]
bm
(
t0 + s,X(s), γ
)
ρ(dγ, ds)
+
∫ t
0
σm
(
t0 + s,X(s)
)
dW (s), t ∈ [0, T − t0],
(4.5)
has a unique solution X = Xt0,x,ρ, that is, X is the unique (up to indis-
tinguishability with respect to P) Rd-valued (Ft)-adapted continuous pro-
cess that satisfies (4.5) with P-probability one. Although the solution X of
Eq. (4.5) starts in x at time zero, it corresponds to the solution of Eq. (4.2)
starting in x at time t0. Define the costs associated with strategy ρ and
initial condition (t0, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd by
Jm(t0, x, ρ)
.
= E
[∫
Γ×[0,T−t0]
fm
(
t0 + s,X(s), γ
)
ρ(dγ, ds) + Fm
(
X(T − t0)
)]
,
where X = Xt0,x,ρ. The corresponding value function Vm is given by
Vm(t, x)
.
= inf
ρ∈U
Jm(t, x, ρ),
which is well-defined as a measurable function [0, T ]×Rd → [0,∞). Actually,
Vm is continuous. For x ∈ Rd, ρ ∈ U , set
Θx,ρ
.
= P ◦(X0,x,ρ, ρ,W )−1.
Then Θx,ρ is a solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures m and
Jm(0, x, ρ) = Jˆ(δx,Θ
x,ρ;m).
Conversely, in view of Lemma 4.1 and thanks to Assumption (A6), any Θ ∈
P(Z) with Jˆ(δx,Θ;m) < ∞ induces a strategy ρ ∈ U such that Θx,ρ = Θ.
27
It follows that Vm(0, x) = Vˆ (δx;m) for every x ∈ Rd and, by conditioning on
the initial state at time zero,∫
Rd
Vm(0, x)m(0)(dx) = Vˆ (m(0);m).
Second step. The function Vm(0, ·) is locally Lipschitz continuous. To
be more precise, choose c0 > 0, Γ0 ⊂ Γ according to (A6), and let r0 > 0 be
such that Γ0 ⊂
{
γ ∈ Rd2 : |γ| ≤ r0
}
. We are going to show that there exists
a constant C1 ∈ (0,∞) depending only on K, L, T , m, r0, and c0 such that
(4.6) |Vm(0, x)− Vm(0, x˜)| ≤ C1 (1 +R) |x− x˜| whenever |x| ∨ |x˜| ≤ R.
To establish (4.6), set, for ε > 0, R > 0,
Uε,R .= {ρ ∈ U : Jm(0, x; ρ) ≤ Vm(0, x) + ε for some x with |x| ≤ R} .
Then for all x, x˜ ∈ Rd with |x| ∨ |x˜| ≤ R,
|Vm(0, x) − Vm(0, x˜)| ≤ inf
ε>0
sup
ρ∈Uε,R
|Jm(0, x; ρ) − Jm(0, x˜; ρ)| .
Let x, x˜ ∈ Rd, ρ ∈ U , and let X, X˜ be the solutions of (4.5) under ρ
with initial state x and x˜, respectively. Using Hölder’s inequality, Jensen’s
inequality, Itô’s isometry, Fubini’s theorem, assumption (A2), and Gronwall’s
lemma, we find that there exists a constant CL,T depending only on L, T
such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣∣X(t)− X˜(t)∣∣∣2] ≤ CL,T |x− x˜| .
Reusing the same tools but with assumption (A3) in place of (A2) (also cf.
Lemma 3.1), we find that that there exists a constant CK,T,m depending only
on K, T , and on m (through supt∈[0,T ]
∫ |y|2m(t)(dy), which is finite since m
is continuous in time) such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|X(t)|2
]
≤ CK,T,m
(
1 + |x|2 +E
[∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2ρ(dγ, dt)
])
.
Thanks to the above estimates and assumption (A4), we have that there exist
a constant CL,T,m depending only on L, T , and m, and a constant CK,L,T,m
depending only on K, L, T , and m such that
|Jm(0, x; ρ) − Jm(0, x˜; ρ)|
≤ CL,T,m
(
1 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
√
E
[
|X(t)|2
]
+ sup
t∈[0,T ]
√
E
[∣∣∣X˜(t)∣∣∣2]
)
· |x− x˜|
≤ CK,L,T,m

1 + |x| ∨ |x˜|+
√√√√E
[∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2ρ(dγ, dt)
] · |x− x˜| .
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It follows that for all x, x˜ ∈ Rd with |x| ∨ |x˜| ≤ R,
|Vm(0, x)− Vm(0, x˜)|
≤ CK,L,T,m · inf
ε>0

1 +R+ sup
ρ∈Uε,R
√√√√E
[∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2ρ(dγ, dt)
]
 · |x− x˜|.
By the same estimates as above, but using (A5) instead of (A4), we find
that there exists a constant C˜K,T,m depending only on K, T , m such that,
for all x ∈ Rd, all ρ ∈ U ,
Jm(0, x; ρ) ≤ C˜K,T,m
(
1 + |x|2 +E
[∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2ρ(dγ, dt)
])
.
This implies that there exists a constant CK,T,m,Γ depending only on K, T ,
m, and on Γ (through minγ∈Γ |γ|2) such that, for all x ∈ Rd,
Vm(0, x) ≤ CK,T,m,Γ
(
1 + |x|2) .
Let ρ ∈ Uε,R for some ε > 0. Choose x ∈ Rd with |x| ≤ R such that
Jm(0, x; ρ) ≤ Vm(0, x) + ε (possible by definition of Uε,R). By the coercivity
assumption (A6),
Jm(0, x; ρ) ≥ c0E
[∫
(Γ\Γ0)×[0,T ]
|γ|2ρ(dγ, dt)
]
,
hence
c0E
[∫
(Γ\Γ0)×[0,T ]
|γ|2ρ(dγ, dt)
]
≤ CK,T,m,Γ
(
1 +R2
)
+ ε.
By construction,
E
[∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2ρ(dγ, dt)
]
≤ T · r20 +E
[∫
(Γ\Γ0)×[0,T ]
|γ|2ρ(dγ, dt)
]
.
It follows that there exists a constant CK,T,m,c0,r0 depending only on K, T ,
m, c0, and on r0 (clearly, minγ∈Γ |γ|2 ≤ r20) such that
sup
ρ∈Uε,R
√√√√E
[∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2ρ(dγ, dt)
]
≤ CK,T,m,c0,r0
(
1 +R+
√
ε
)
.
This establishes (4.6).
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Third Step. For M ∈ N, set ΓM .= {γ ∈ Γ : |γ| ≤M}. For M big
enough, say M ≥ M0, ΓM is non-empty. Choose γ0 ∈ ΓM0 , and set ΓM .=
{γ0} if M < M0. Then, for every M ∈ N, ΓM is compact (and non-empty)
and ΓM ⊂ ΓM+1. Set
UM .= {ρ ∈ U : ρ(ΓM × [0, T ]) = T P -almost surely} ,
and let Vm,M be the value function defined with respect to UM instead of U .
We claim that
(4.7) Vm,M (0, ·)
M→∞
ց Vm(0, ·) uniformly over compact subsets of Rd.
Notice that, by construction, Vm,M(0, ·) ≥ Vm,M+1(0, ·) ≥ Vm(0, ·) for every
M ∈ N. By Step 2, we know that Vm(0, ·) is locally Lipschitz. Repeating
the arguments of Step 2 (notice that UM ⊂ U by definition), we find that
inequality (4.6) also holds for Vm,M(0, ·) in place of Vm(0, ·) and that the
constant C1 can be chosen independently of M ∈ N. To establish (4.7), it
is therefore enough to check that point-wise convergence holds. Fix x ∈ Rd.
It suffices to show that given ρ ∈ U there exits a sequence (ρ(M)) ⊂ U such
that ρ(M) ∈ UM for every M and Jm(0, x; ρ(M))→ Jm(0, x; ρ) as M →∞.
Let ρ ∈ U . For M ∈ N, let ρ(M) ∈ UM be such that for every B ∈ B(Γ),
every I ∈ B([0, T ]),
ρ(M)(B × I) = ρ((B ∩ ΓM )× I) + ρ((Γ \ ΓM )× I) · δγ0(B).
This determines a unique strategy ρ(M) ∈ UM . Clearly, ρ(M) comes with the
same stochastic basis as ρ. If (ρ˙t) is a version of the time derivative process
associated with ρ (thus, ρ(dγ, dt) = ρ˙t(dγ)dt), then a version of the time
derivative process of ρ(M) is given by
ρ˙
(M)
t (dγ) = 1ΓM (γ) · ρt(dγ) + ρt(Γ \ ΓM ) · δγ0(dγ).
Let X, X(M) be the solutions of (4.5) under ρ and ρ(M), respectively. Thanks
to Hölder’s inequality, Jensen’s inequality, Itô’s isometry, Fubini’s theorem,
and assumption (A2), there exists a constant CL,T depending only on L, T
such that, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
E
[∣∣∣X(t) −X(M)(t)∣∣∣2] ≤ CL,T
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣X(s)−X(M)(s)∣∣∣2] ds
+ CL,T E


∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Γ×[0,t]
bm
(
s,X(s), γ
) (
ρ(M) − ρ
)
(dγ, ds)
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 .
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Using the definition of ρ(M), Hölder’s inequality and assumption (A3), we
find that, for some constant CK,T,m depending only on K, T and m,
E


∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Γ×[0,t]
bm
(
s,X(s), γ
) (
ρ(M) − ρ
)
(dγ, ds)
∣∣∣∣∣
2


≤ 2T E
[∫ T
0
∫
Γ\ΓM
∣∣bm(s,X(s), γ)∣∣2 ρ˙s(dγ)ds
]
+ 2E
[
ρ ((Γ \ ΓM )× [0, T ]) ·
∫ T
0
∣∣bm(s,X(s), γ0)∣∣2 ds
]
≤ CK,T,mE
[
ρ
(
(Γ \ ΓM )× [0, T ]
) ·
(
1 + sup
r∈[0,T ]
|X(r)|2
)]
+ CK,T,mE
[∫
Γ×[0,T ]
1Γ\ΓM (γ) · |γ|2ρ(dγ, ds)
]
.
By (A3) and the usual estimates, including Gronwall’s lemma, we have
E
[
supr∈[0,T ] |X(r)|2
]
< ∞. Since ρω is a measure with total mass T for
every ω ∈ Ω, we have ρ((Γ \ ΓM)× [0, T ])→ 0 as M →∞ P-almost surely.
This implies, by dominated convergence,
E
[
ρ
(
(Γ \ ΓM )× [0, T ]
) ·
(
1 + sup
r∈[0,T ]
|X(r)|2
)]
M→∞−→ 0.
On the other hand, E
[∫
Γ×[0,T ] |γ|2ρ(dγ, ds)
]
< ∞ by definition of U . This
means that
E
[∫
Γ×[0,T ]
1Γ\ΓM (γ) · |γ|2ρ(dγ, ds)
]
M→∞−→ 0.
An application of Gronwall’s lemma now yields
E
[∣∣∣X(t)−X(M)(t)∣∣∣2] M→∞−→ 0.
This convergence together with assumption (A5) (and an estimate com-
pletely analogous to the one above) implies that Jm(0, x; ρ
(M))→ Jm(0, x; ρ)
as M →∞.
Fourth Step. Choose a family (ΓM,k)M,k∈N of finite subsets of Γ such
that ΓM,k ⊂ ΓM,k+1 ⊂ ΓM , ΓM,k ⊂ ΓM+1,k, and minγ˜∈ΓM,k |γ− γ˜| ≤ 1/k for
any γ ∈ ΓM . Let UM,k be the set of all ρ ∈ U such that ρ is the R2-valued
random variable induced by a ΓM,k-valued adapted process that is piece-wise
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constant in time with respect to the equidistant grid of step size T ·2−k. Thus,
((Ω,F ,P), (Ft), ρ,W ) ∈ UM,k if and only if ρω(dγ, dt) = δu(t,ω)(dγ)dt for P-
almost every ω ∈ Ω, where u is a ΓM,k-valued (Ft)-progressively measurable
process with càdlàg trajectories that are piece-wise constant over the grid
{0, T ·2−k, 2T ·2−k, 3T ·2−k, . . . , T}. Let Vm,M,k be the value function defined
with respect to UM,k. Then, thanks to the continuity in time and control
of the coefficients according to (A1), a version of the chattering lemma [for
instance, Theorem 3.5.2 in Kushner, 1990, p. 59], and the local Lipschitz
continuity of Vm,M,k(0, ·), which holds uniformly in k and M (one repeats
the arguments of Step 2), we find that
Vm,M,k(0, ·)
k→∞
ց Vm,M(0, ·) uniformly over compact subsets of Rd.
By (4.7) and since UM,k ⊂ UM,k+1 ⊂ UM and UM,k ⊂ UM+1,k, it follows that
(4.8) Vm,M,M(0, ·)
M→∞
ց Vm(0, ·) uniformly over compact subsets of Rd.
Fifth step. The value function Vm,M,k coincides with the value function
of a discrete-time optimal control problem defined as follows. Set h
.
= T ·2−k.
Thanks to Theorem 1 in Kallenberg [1996] and because ΓM,k is finite, we find
a measurable and universally predictable function
Φm,M,k : N0 × Rd × ΓM,k ×C([0, h],Rd1)→ Rd
such that Φm,M,k(j, x, γ,W ) = X((j + 1)h) P-almost surely whenever X is
the unique strong solution to
X(t) = x+
∫ t
0
bm
(
j · h+ s,X(s), γ)ds
+
∫ t
0
σm
(
j · h+ s,X(s))dW (s), t ∈ [0, h],
where W is a d1-dimensional standard Wiener process defined on some
stochastic basis ((Ω,F ,P), (Ft)). The function Φm,M,k is the system func-
tion of the control problem in the sense of Bertsekas and Shreve [1996]. Let
U¯M,k denote the set of discrete-time Markov feedback strategies with values
in ΓM,k, that is, the set of all Borel measurable functions v : N0×Rd → ΓM,k.
To describe the path-wise evolution of the system, choose a complete prob-
ability space (Ω◦,F◦,P◦) rich enough to carry a d1-dimensional standard
Wiener process W◦. For j ∈ N0, set ζj .= (W (jh+ s)−W (jh))s∈[0,h], which
defines a C([0, h],Rd1)-valued random variable. Given any Markov feedback
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strategy v ∈ U¯M,k and initial condition (j, x) ∈ {0, . . . , 2k} × Rd, the corre-
sponding state sequence is defined recursively, for each ω ∈ Ω◦, by
X0(ω)
.
= x,
Xl+1(ω)
.
= Φm,M,k (j + l,Xl(ω), v(j + l,Xl(ω)), ζl(ω)) ,
(4.9)
l ∈ {0, . . . , 2k − j − 1}. The associated costs are given by
J¯m,M,k(j, x, v)
.
= E◦

2k−j−1∑
l=0
fm
(
(j + l)h,Xl, v(j + l,Xl)
) · h+ Fm(Xk−j)

 ,
where (Xl) is the state sequence generated according to (4.9) with feedback
strategy v and initial condition (j, x). Let V¯m,M,k be the value function of
the control problem just defined:
V¯m,M,k(j, x)
.
= inf
v∈U¯M,k
J¯m,M,k(j, x, v), (j, x) ∈ {0, . . . , 2k} × Rd.
By Proposition 8.6 in Bertsekas and Shreve [1996, pp. 209-210], the prin-
ciple of dynamic programming applies to V¯m,M,k. This has two consequences.
First, notice that any feedback strategy v ∈ U¯M,k induces, for any given ini-
tial condition (j, x) ∈ {0, . . . , 2k} × Rd, a relaxed control variable ρ ∈ UM,k
such that
J¯m,M,k(j, x, v) = Jm(jh, x, ρ).
This implies V¯m,M,k(j, x) ≥ Vm,M,k(jh, x) for all (j, x) ∈ {0, . . . , 2k} × Rd.
Since V¯m,M,k(2
k, ·) = Fm(·) = Vm,M,k(2kh, ·), it follows by dynamic program-
ming for V¯m,M,k and backward induction that
V¯m,M,k(j, x) = Vm,M,k(jh, x) for all (j, x) ∈ {0, . . . , 2k} × Rd.
As a second consequence of the principle of dynamic programming, there
exists an optimal Markov feedback strategy. More precisely, we can choose
v∗ ∈ U¯M,k such that, for every (j, x) ∈ {0, . . . , 2k} ×Rd,
v∗(j, x) ∈ argminγ∈ΓM,k
{
fm(jh, x, γ) · h
+
∫
C([0,h],Rd1)
V¯m,M,k
(
j + 1,Φm,M,k(j, x, γ, y)
)
ηh(dy)
}
,
where ηh is standard Wiener measure on B(C([0, h],Rd1)). Then
J¯m,M,k(j, x, v∗) = V¯m,M,k(j, x) for all (j, x) ∈ {0, . . . , 2k} × Rd.
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Sixth step. Define a function ψmM,k : [0, T ]×Rd×W → ΓM,k as follows.
Let x ∈ Rd, w ∈ W. In analogy with (4.9), recursively define a sequence
(xj)j∈{0,...,2k} by
x0
.
= x, xj+1
.
= Φm,M,k
(
j, xj , v∗(j, xj), (w(jh + s)− w(jh))s∈[0,h]
)
.
For j ∈ {0, . . . , 2k − 1}, s ∈ [0, h), set
ψmM,k(jh + s, x,w)
.
= v∗(j, xj),
and set ψmM,k(T, x,w)
.
= v∗(2
k, xk). By construction, ψ
m
M,k is progressively
measurable with values in a finite set. Let ((Ω,F ,P), (Ft)) be a stochas-
tic basis rich enough to carry a d1-dimensional (Ft)-Wiener process W and
an Rd-valued F0-measurable random variable ξ such that P ◦ξ−1 = m(0).
For every x ∈ Rd, the process ψmM,k(t, x,W ) induces a relaxed control ran-
dom variable ρ such that ((Ω,F ,P), (Ft), ρ,W ) ∈ UM,k and Jm(0, x, ρ) =
Vm,M,k(0, x). Let ρ
M,k be the relaxed control random variable in UM,k in-
duced by the process ψmM,k(t, ξ,W ). Let XM,k be the unique continuous (Ft)-
adapted process such that XM,k(0) = ξ and ((Ω,F ,P), (Ft),XM,k, ρM,k,W )
is a solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures m. Set
ΘmM,k
.
= P ◦(XM,k, ρM,k,W )−1.
Then ΘmM,k ∈ P2(Z) and ΘmM,k is a solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures
m such that ΘmM,k ◦ (Xˆ(0))−1 = m(0), ρˆ(dγ, dt) = δψm
M,k(t,Xˆ(0),Wˆ)
(dγ)dt with
probability one under ΘmM,k, and
Jˆ(m(0),ΘmM,k;m) =
∫
Rd
Vm,M,k(0, x)m(0)(dx) <∞.
By (4.8) and dominated convergence, it follows that
Jˆ(m(0),ΘmM,M ;m)
M→∞
ց Vˆ (m(0);m).
Hence, given any ε > 0, there exists M(ε) ∈ N such that, for all M ≥M(ε),
Jˆ(m(0),ΘmM,M ;m) ≤ Vˆ (m(0);m) + ε.
Remark 4.4. The conditions of Lemma 4.3 do not determine ψmε in a unique
way. On the other hand, once ψmε has been constructed, the probability
measure Θmε is uniquely determined as the law of the solution of Eq. (4.2)
with flow of measures m, initial distribution m(0) and control process u given
by u(t)
.
= ψmε (t,X(0),W ), t ∈ [0, T ], where W is the driving Wiener process
and u is identified with its relaxed control random variable. Notice that u is
square-integrable since ψmε takes values in a finite subset of Γ.
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5 Convergence of Nash equilibria
For N ∈ N, let uN1 , . . . , uNN ∈ H2((FNt ),PN ; Γ) be individual strategies for
the N -player game, and let uN
.
= (uN1 , . . . , u
N
N ) be the corresponding strat-
egy vector. Let QN be the normalized occupation measure associated with
uN . More precisely, QN is the P2(Z)-valued random variable determined by
setting, for B ∈ B(X ), R ∈ B(R2), D ∈ B(W),
(5.1) QNω (B×R×D) .=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δXNi (·,ω)
(B) ·δ
ρN,iω
(R) ·δWNi (·,ω)(D), ω ∈ ΩN ,
where (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ) is the solution of the system of equations (3.1) under
strategy vector uN , and ρN,i is the relaxed control associated with individual
strategy uNi , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Convergence results will be obtained under the hypothesis that
(T) ∃ δ0 > 0 : sup
N∈N
EN
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
|ξNi |2+δ0 +
∫ T
0
|uNi (t)|2+δ0dt
)]
<∞.
Whenever (T) holds, we will—as we may—suppose that δ0 ∈ (0, 1 ∧ T ].
Remark 5.1. Condition (T) is automatically satisfied if the action space Γ
is compact and the initial states, i.e., the random variables ξNi , N ∈ N,
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, are uniformly bounded.
Lemma 5.1. If condition (T) holds, then the family (PN ◦(QN )−1)N∈N is
pre-compact in P(P2(Z)).
Proof. We verify that condition (T) implies the pre-compactness of the fam-
ily (PN ◦(QN )−1)N∈N by using a suitable tightness function on P2(Z). For
a function ψ on [0, T ] with values in Rd or Rd1 , let wψ(·, T ) denote the
modulus of continuity of ψ on [0, T ], that is, the function
[0,∞) ∋ h 7→ wψ(h, T ) .= sup
t,s∈[0,T ]:|t−s|≤h
|ψ(t) − ψ(s)| ∈ [0,∞].
If ψ is continuous, then the modulus of continuity of ψ takes values in [0,∞).
Clearly, wψ(h, T ) = wψ(T, T ) whenever h > T . Choose δ0 > 0 according to
condition (T), and set α
.
= δ02(8+δ0) . Define the function g : P2(Z) → [0,∞]
by
g(Θ)
.
=
∫
Z
(
‖ϕ‖2+δ0X + |w(0)| +
∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2+δ0 r(dγ, dt)
+ sup
h∈(0,1]
{
h−α (wϕ(h, T ) +ww(h, T ))
})
Θ(dϕ, dr, dw).
(5.2)
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Then g is a tightness function on P2(Z); see Appendix B.2. It is therefore
enough to check that condition (T) entails supN∈N EN
[
g(QN )
]
< ∞. By
definition of QN and g,
EN
[
g(QN )
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
‖XNi ‖2+δ0X +
∫ T
0
|uNi (t)|2+δ0dt
]
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
sup
h∈(0,1]
{
h−α
(
wXNi
(h, T ) +wWNi
(h, T )
)}]
.
By Lemma 3.2 and condition (T),
sup
N∈N
{
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
‖XNi ‖2+δ0X +
∫ T
0
|uNi (t)|2+δ0dt
]}
<∞.
As to the terms involving the moduli of continuity, set p
.
= 2 + δ0/2; then,
by monotonicity of h 7→ h−α and Markov’s inequality (as well as Jensen’s
inequality),
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
sup
h∈(0,1]
{
h−α
(
wXNi
(h, T ) +wWNi
(h, T )
)}]
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
sup
k∈N:k≥1/T
{
(k + 1)α
(
wXNi
(
1
k , T
)
+wWNi
(
1
k , T
))}]
≤ 1 + 1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ ∞
1
∞∑
k=1
PN
(
wXNi
(
1
k , T
)
+wWNi
(
1
k , T
) ≥ M
(k + 1)α
)
dM
≤ 1 +
∞∑
k=1
(k + 1)α·p
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
wXNi
(
1
k , T
)p
+wWNi
(
1
k , T
)p]) 2p−1
p− 1 ,
where we have used that
∫∞
1 M
−p dM = 1/(p − 1) since p > 1. To find an
upper bound for the above sums that does not depend on N , we employ
estimates on the moments of the modulus of continuity of Itô processes; cf.
Fischer and Nappo [2010] and the references therein. Since WN1 , . . . ,W
N
N
are standard d1-dimensional Wiener processes, we have by Lemma 3 of that
paper and Hölder’s inequality that there exists a finite constant C¯p,d1 de-
pending only on p and d1 such that, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, every k ∈ N
with k ≥ 1/T ,
EN
[
wWNi
(
1
k , T
)p] ≤ C¯p,d1
(
log(2Tk)
k
)p/2
.
Recall that p = 2+ δ0/2. By Theorem 1 in Fischer and Nappo [2010], there
exists a finite constant C¯δ0,d,d1 depending only on δ0 (through p = 2 + δ0/2
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and δ0/2 = 2 + δ0 − p), d, and d1 such that, for every k ∈ N with k ≥ 1/T ,
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
wXNi
(
1
k , T
)2+δ0/2]
≤ C¯δ0,d,d1
(
log(2Tk)
k
)1+δ0/4
·

 1
N
N∑
i=1
EN

 sup
s,t∈[0,T ]:s<t
(∫ t
s
∣∣b(s˜, XNi (s˜), µN (s˜), uNi (s˜))∣∣ ds˜√
|t− s|
)2+δ0/2
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
∣∣σ(s,XNi (s), µN (s))∣∣2+δ0
]
+ 1
)
.
Thanks to assumption (A3), Lemma 3.2 and condition (T), we have
sup
N∈N
{
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
∣∣σ(s,XNi (s), µN (s))∣∣2+δ0
]}
<∞.
On the other hand, by Hölder’s inequality,
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN

 sup
s,t∈[0,T ]:s<t
(∫ t
s
∣∣b(s˜, XNi (s˜), µN (s˜), uNi (s˜))∣∣ ds˜√
|t− s|
)2+δ0/2
≤ T δ0/4 · 1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[∫ T
0
∣∣b(s˜, XNi (s˜), µN (s˜), uNi (s˜))∣∣2+δ0/2 ds˜
]
,
and, thanks to assumption (A3), Lemma 3.1 and condition (T),
sup
N∈N
{
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[∫ T
0
∣∣b(s˜, XNi (s˜), µN (s˜), uNi (s˜))∣∣2+δ0/2 ds˜
]}
<∞.
Recall that α = δ02(8+δ0) and p = 2 + δ0/2. It follows that, for some finite
constant C¯K,T,δ0,d,d1 not depending on N ,
sup
N∈N
{
1
N
N∑
i=1
EN
[
sup
h∈(0,1]
{
h−α
(
wXNi
(h, T ) +wWNi
(h, T )
)}]}
≤ C¯K,T,δ0,d,d1
(
1 +
∞∑
k=1
(k + 1)α·p
(
log(2Tk)
k
)p/2)
,
where the infinite sum on the right-hand side above has a finite limit since
p/2− α · p = (8 + 2δ0)/(8 + δ0) > 1.
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Below, we will use the symbol I to indicate the index set of a (convergent)
subsequence; thus I is a subset of N with the natural ordering and #I =∞.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose that (Pn ◦ξnin∗ )n∈I converges in P2(Rd) to some ν¯ ∈
P2(Rd), where, for each n ∈ I, in∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then there exists a sequence
(ξ¯n)n∈I of R
d-valued random variables such that the following hold:
(i) for every n ∈ I, ξ¯n is defined on (Ωn,Fn), measurable with respect to
σ(ξnin∗ , ϑ
n
in∗
) ⊂ Fn0 , and such that Pn ◦(ξ¯n)−1 = ν¯;
(ii) En
[
|ξnin∗ − ξ¯n|2
]
→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. Set νn
.
= Pn ◦(ξnin∗ )−1. By hypothesis,
d2 (νn, ν¯)
n→∞−→ 0.
Let n ∈ I. By definition of the square Wasserstein metric,
d2 (νn, ν¯)
2 = inf
α∈P(Rd×Rd):[α]1=νn and [α]2=ν¯
∫
Rd×Rd
|x− x˜|2 α(dx, dx˜).
The infimum in the above equation is attained; see, for instance, Theorem 1.3
(Kantorovich’s theorem) in Villani [2003, pp. 19-20]. Thus, there exists αn∗ ∈
P(Rd × Rd) such that [αn∗ ]1 = νn, [αn∗ ]2 = ν¯ and
d2 (νn, ν¯)
2 =
∫
Rd×Rd
|x− x˜|2 αn∗ (dx, dx˜).
Recall that ϑn1 , . . . , ϑ
n
n are independent Fn0 -measurable random variables
which are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and independent of the σ-algebra
generated by ξn1 , . . . , ξ
n
n ,W
n
1 , . . . ,W
n
n . By Theorem 6.10 in Kallenberg [2001,
p. 112] on measurable transfers, there exists a measurable function ϕn :
R
d × [0, 1]→ Rd such that
Pn ◦
(
ξnin∗ , ϕn(ξ
n
in∗
, ϑnin∗ )
)−1
= αn∗ .
Set ξ¯n
.
= ϕn(ξ
n
in∗
, ϑnin∗ ). Then ξ¯
n is σ(ξnin∗ , ϑ
n
in∗
)-measurable, Pn ◦
(
ξ¯n
)−1
= ν¯,
and
En
[
|ξnin∗ − ξ¯n|2
]
= d2 (νn, ν¯)
2 ,
which tends to zero as n→∞.
Lemma 5.3. Grant condition (T). Let (Qn)n∈I be a subsequence that con-
verges in distribution to some P2(Z)-valued random variable Q defined on
some probability space (Ω,F ,P). Set
µω(t)
.
= Qω ◦ Xˆ(t)−1, t ∈ [0, T ], ω ∈ Ω.
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Then for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω, µω ∈M2 and Qω is a solution of Eq. (4.2)
with flow of measures µω. Moreover,
lim inf
I∋n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
Jni (u
n) ≥
∫
Ω
Jˆ
(
µω(0), Qω , µω
)
P(dω).
Proof. By Lemma 5.1, (PN ◦(QN )−1)N∈N is pre-compact in P(P2(Z)). Let
(Qn)n∈I be a subsequence that converges in distribution to some P2(Z)-
valued random variable Q, defined on some probability space (Ω,F ,P). Set
µω(t)
.
= Qω ◦ Xˆ(t)−1, t ∈ [0, T ], ω ∈ Ω. Since Qω ∈ P2(Z) for every ω ∈ Ω,
we have µω ∈ M2 for every ω ∈ Ω; cf. Remark 4.2 above. By construction,
Wˆ (0) = 0 Qnω-almost surely for Pn-almost every ω ∈ Ωn. Convergence in
distribution implies Wˆ (0) = 0 Qω-almost surely for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω.
In order to verify that Qω is a solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures
µω for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω, it suffices to check that condition (iii) of
Definition 4.1 holds. The proof of this fact is analogous to the proof of
Lemma 5.2 in Budhiraja et al. [2012]. Since the situation here is somewhat
different, we give details in Appendix C below.
The asymptotic lower bound for the average costs is a consequence of a
version of Fatou’s lemma [cf. Theorem A.3.12 Dupuis and Ellis, 1997, p. 307]
since, for every n ∈ I,
1
n
n∑
i=1
Jni (u
n) =
∫
Ωn
∫
Z
(∫
Γ×[0,T ]
f
(
t, ϕ(t), Qnω ◦ Xˆ(t)−1, γ
)
r(dγ, dt)
F
(
T, ϕ(T ), Qnω ◦ Xˆ(T )−1
))
Qnω(dϕ, dr, dw) Pn(dω)
and Qnω ◦ Xˆ(t)−1 → µ(t) in distribution as n→∞.
Remark 5.2. Lemma 5.3 shows that, under condition (T), all limit points of
the normalized occupation measures (QN )N∈N are concentrated on those ran-
dom variables that, with probability one, take values in the set of McKean-
Vlasov solutions of Eq. (4.2). The mean field condition of Definition 4.3 is
therefore always satisfied.
In addition to (T), we will need the following weak symmetry condition
on the costs:
∃ a sequence of indices (iN∗ )N∈N with iN∗ ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that
sup
N∈N
JNiN∗
(uN ) <∞ and lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
JNi (u
N ) ≤ lim sup
N→∞
JNiN∗
(uN ).
(S)
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Remark 5.3. Condition (S) is automatically satisfied if the cost coefficients
f , F are bounded functions. If f , F are unbounded and the costs associated
with uN are symmetric in the sense that, for every N , every i ∈ {2, . . . , N},
JN1 (u
N ) = JNi (u
N ), then, thanks to assumption (A5) and Lemma 3.1, con-
dition (S) follows from condition (T).
Theorem 5.1. Let (εN )N∈N ⊂ [0,∞) be a sequence converging to zero.
Suppose that (ξN )N∈N and (u
N )N∈N are such that (T) and (S) hold and,
for each N ∈ N, ξN = (ξN1 , . . . , ξNN ) is exchangeable and uN is a local εN -
Nash equilibrium for the N -player game. Let (Qn)n∈I be a subsequence that
converges in distribution to some P2(Z)-valued random variable Q defined on
some probability space (Ω,F ,P). If there is m ∈ M2 such that, for P-almost
every ω ∈ Ω,
Qω ◦ Xˆ(t)−1 = m(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
then (Qω,m) is a solution of the mean field game for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω.
We postpone the proof of Theorem 5.1 to the end of this section. The
crucial hypothesis in Theorem 5.1 is the almost sure non-randomness of the
flow of measures induced by a limit random variable Q. Thus, under the
rather general conditions (T) and (S), we prove convergence to solutions of
a mean field game for subsequences with limit random variable Q such that
P ◦(Q ◦ (Xˆ(t))−1t∈[0,T ])−1 = δm for some m ∈ M2. This condition is reminis-
cent of the characterization of propagation of chaos in the Tanaka-Sznitman
theorem. The non-randomness of the induced flow of measures is implied by
the non-randomness of the joint law of initial condition, relaxed control and
noise process, that is, by the condition P ◦(Q ◦ (Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ )−1)−1 = δν for
some ν ∈ P(Rd ×R2 ×W). This condition, in turn, is satisfied if the initial
states and individual strategies of each N -player game are independent and
identically distributed, where the marginal distributions are allowed to vary
with N .
Corollary 5.2. Let (εN )N∈N ⊂ [0,∞) be a sequence converging to zero.
Suppose that (ξN )N∈N and (u
N )N∈N are such that (T) holds and, for each
N ∈ N, uN is a local εN -Nash equilibrium for the N -player game and the ran-
dom variables (ξN1 , u
N
1 ,W
N
1 ), . . . , (ξ
N
N , u
N
N ,W
N
N ) are independent and identi-
cally distributed. Let (Qn)n∈I be a subsequence that converges in distribution
to some P2(Z)-valued random variable Q defined on some probability space
(Ω,F ,P). Then Qω is a solution of the mean field game for P-almost every
ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. By distributional symmetry of the vectors of initial states and indi-
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vidual strategies, the costs are symmetric and condition (T) entails condi-
tion (S); cf. Remark 5.3 above.
Let T ⊂ Cb(Rd ×R2 ×W) be a countable and measure determining set
of functions. Let (Qn)n∈I be a convergent subsequence with limit random
variable Q on (Ω,F ,P). Let Ψ ∈ T , and set
mΨ
.
= EP
[
EQ
[
Ψ
(
Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ
)]]
,
vΨ
.
= EP
[(
EQ
[
Ψ
(
Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ
)]−mΨ)2
]
,
mnΨ
.
= En
[
EQn
[
Ψ
(
Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ
)]]
, n ∈ I.
The mapping Θ 7→ ∫ ΨdΘ is continuous on P2(Z). By convergence of (Qn)
to Q and the continuous mapping theorem,
vΨ = lim
n→∞
En
[(
EQn
[
Ψ
(
Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ
)]−mnΨ)2
]
= lim
n→∞
En

( 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ψ
(
ξni , ρ
n,i,W ni
)−mnΨ
)2 ,
where ρn,i is the relaxed control random variable induced by uni . As a
consequence of the i.i.d. hypothesis, the random variables Ψ(ξni , ρ
n,i,W ni ),
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are independent and identically distributed with common
mean equal to mnΨ. Since Ψ is bounded, it follows that vΨ = 0. This implies
EQ
[
Ψ
(
Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ
)]
= mΨ P -almost surely.
Since T is countable, we have with P-probability one
EQ
[
Ψ
(
Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ
)]
= mΨ for all Ψ ∈ T .
Since T is also measure determining, it follows that there exists a measure
ν ∈ P(Rd ×R2 ×W) such that, for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω,
Qω ◦
(
Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ
)−1
= ν.
On the other hand, we know by Lemma 5.3 that Qω ∈ P2(Z) is a McKean-
Vlasov solution of Eq. (4.2) for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω. Uniqueness of such
solutions according to Lemma 4.2 yields the existence of a measure Θ ∈
P2(Z) such that Qω = Θ for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω. Let m ∈ M2 be the
flow of measures induced by Θ. Then, for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω,
Qω ◦ Xˆ(t)−1 = m(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
The assertion is now a consequence of Theorem 5.1.
41
Existence of local approximate Nash equilibria as required in Corol-
lary 5.2 is guaranteed, in particular, under the hypotheses of Proposition 3.1
above (compact action space, bounded coefficients). Suppose that (ξN ) is
such that, for each N ∈ N, ξN is a vector of independent and identically dis-
tributed random variables with common marginal mN0 ∈ P2(Rd) and that,
for some δ0 > 0, supN∈N
∫ |x|2+δ0mN0 (dx) < ∞. Then, by Proposition 3.1,
there exists a corresponding sequence (uN ) of local approximate Nash equi-
libria such that the hypotheses of Corollary 5.2 are satisfied. In addition to
the desired limit relation, we thus obtain a proof of existence of solutions for
the mean field game. Note that existence of solutions is just a by-product of
our analysis; analogous existence results can in fact be obtained by directly
working with the mean field game; see Lacker [2015a]. The proof there is
based, as in Proposition 3.1 here, on relaxed controls and a version of Fan’s
fixed point theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. By hypothesis, Q◦Xˆ(·)−1 = m(·) P-almost surely for
some deterministic m ∈ M2. In view of Lemma 5.3, it is enough to show
that the pair (Qω,m) satisfies the optimality condition of Definition 4.3 with
P-probability one. This is equivalent to showing that Jˆ(m(0), Qω ;m) =
Vˆ (m(0);m) for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω.
Let ε > 0. Choose a function ψmε : [0, T ]×Rd×W → Γ and a probability
measure Θmε ∈ P2(Z) according to Lemma 4.3. Choose a sequence of indices
(in∗ )n∈I according to condition (S). We will, as we may, assume that i
n
∗ = 1
for every n ∈ I; otherwise renumber the components of the n-player games.
The proof proceeds in five steps. First, we construct a coupling for the ini-
tial conditions. In the second step, based on that coupling and the feedback
function ψmε , we define a competitor strategy u˜
n that differs from un only in
component one (= in∗ ). As verified in step three, the associated normalized
occupation measures have the same limit Q as the sequence (Qn). This is
used in the fourth step to show that lim supn→∞ J
n
1 (u˜
n) ≤ Vˆ (m(0);m) + ε.
Thanks to this upper limit, the local approximate Nash equilibrium property
of un together with condition (S), and the asymptotic lower bound on the
average costs from Lemma 5.3, we establish optimality in the fifth and last
step.
First step. By hypothesis, (Pn ◦(Qn)−1)n∈I converges to P ◦Q−1 in
P(P2(Z)). By the choice of the metric on Z, the continuity of the map Z ∋
(ϕ, r, w) 7→ ϕ(0) ∈ Rd, and the mapping theorem [for instance, Theorem 5.1
in Billingsley, 1968, p. 30], we have that
P2(Z) ∋ Θ 7→ Θ ◦ (Xˆ(0))−1 ∈ P2(Rd)
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is continuous. This implies, again by the continuous mapping theorem, that
Pn ◦
(
Qn ◦ (Xˆ(0))−1
)−1 n→∞−→ P ◦(Q ◦ (Xˆ(0))−1)−1 in P(P2(Rd)).
By construction and hypothesis, respectively,
Qn ◦ (Xˆ(0))−1 = 1
n
n∑
i=1
δξni , while P ◦
(
Q ◦ (Xˆ(0))−1
)−1
= δ
m(0).
It follows that ( 1n
∑n
i=1 δξni )n∈I converges to m(0) in distribution as P2(Rd)-
valued random variables, where m(0) is deterministic. This convergence
implies, in particular, that
En
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
|ξni |2
]
n→∞−→
∫
Rd
|x|2m(0)(dx).
By hypothesis, ξn = (ξn1 , . . . , ξ
n
n) is exchangeable for every n ∈ I. Conver-
gence of the associated empirical measures, by the Tanaka-Sznitman theorem
[for instance, Theorem 3.2 in Gottlieb, 1998, p. 27], implies that
Pn ◦(ξn1 )−1 n→∞−→ m(0) in P(Rd).
Actually, we have convergence in P2(Rd) since, by exchangeability,
En
[|ξn1 |2] = En
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
|ξni |2
]
for every n ∈ I,
and the expectations on the right-hand side above converge to the second
moment of m(0). We are therefore in the situation of Lemma 5.2, and we
apply that result with the choice in∗ = 1 to obtain a sequence (ξ¯
n)n∈I of R
d-
valued random variables such that ξ¯n is σ(ξnin∗ , ϑ
n
in∗
)-measurable, Pn ◦(ξ¯n)−1 =
m(0) and En
[|ξn1 − ξ¯n|2]→ 0 as n→∞.
Second step. Define a strategy vector u˜n = (u˜n1 , . . . , u˜
n
n) by setting, for
(t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ωn,
u˜ni (t, ω)
.
=
{
ψmε
(
t, ξ¯n(ω),W n1 (·, ω)
)
if i = 1,
uni (t, ω) if i ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
Notice that u˜n is indeed a strategy vector for the game with n players.
Moreover, u˜ni = u
n
i for i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, while u˜n1 ∈ H2((Fn,1t ),Pn; Γ). Let ρ˜n,i
be the relaxed control induced by u˜ni , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Clearly, ρ˜n,i = ρn,i
for i ≥ 2. On the other hand, by construction and since ξ¯n and W n1 are
independent,
Pn ◦
(
ξ¯n, ρ˜n,1,W n1
)−1
= Θmε ◦
(
Xˆ(0), ρˆ, Wˆ
)−1
for every n ∈ I.
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The law of u˜n1 , in particular, does not change with n. It follows that
sup
n∈I
En
[∫ T
0
|u˜n1 (t)|2 dt
]
<∞.
The coercivity assumption (A6) implies that there exists C > 0 such that
for every n ∈ I,
En
[∫ T
0
|un1 (t)|2 dt
]
≤ C (1 + Jn1 (un)) .
By choice of the index in∗ = 1 according to (S), we have supn∈N J
n
1 (u
n) <∞.
Since En
[|ξn1 |2] = 1n∑ni=1En [|ξni |2] by exchangeability, it follows that
(5.3) sup
n∈I
En
[
|ξn1 |2 +
∫ T
0
(|un1 (t)|2 + |u˜n1 (t)|2) dt
]
<∞.
Third step. Let (X˜n1 , . . . , X˜
n
n ) be the solution of the system of equa-
tions (3.1) under strategy vector u˜n, and let µ˜N denote the empirical measure
process associated with (X˜n1 , . . . , X˜
n
n ). Let Q˜
n be the normalized occupation
measure associated with u˜n, i.e., the P2(Z)-valued random variable deter-
mined by
Q˜nω(B ×R×D) .=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δX˜ni (·,ω)
(B) · δ
ρ˜n,iω
(R) · δWni (·,ω)(D), ω ∈ Ωn,
B ∈ B(X ), R ∈ B(R2), D ∈ B(W). We are going to show that
(5.4) Q˜n
n→∞−→ Q in distribution as P2(Z)-valued random variables.
Since Qn → Q in distribution, it suffices to show that
dP(P2(Z))
(
Pn ◦(Q˜n)−1,Pn ◦(Qn)−1
)
n→∞−→ 0.
Let n ∈ I. By construction, definition of the bounded Lipschitz metric,
inequality (2.1), and Hölder’s inequality,
dP(P2(Z))
(
Pn ◦(Q˜n)−1,Pn ◦(Qn)−1
)
= sup
G∈C(P2(Z)): ‖G‖bLip≤1
En
[
G
(
Qn
)−G(Q˜n)]
≤ En
[
dP2(Z)
(
Qn, Q˜n
)]
≤
√√√√En
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
dZ
((
Xni , ρ
n,i,W ni
)
,
(
X˜ni , ρ˜
n,i,W ni
))2]
≤ 1√
n
+
√√√√En
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣Xni (t)− X˜ni (t)∣∣2
]
,
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where the last inequality follows by definition of dZ and from the fact that
ρn,i = ρ˜n,i for i ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Using assumption (A2), Hölder’s inequal-
ity, Doob’s maximal inequality, Itô’s isometry, inequality (2.1), and Fubini’s
theorem, we find that for i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, every t ∈ [0, T ],
En
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
∣∣Xni (s)− X˜ni (s)∣∣2
]
≤ 4(T + 4)L2En
[∫ t
0
∣∣Xni (s)− X˜ni (s)∣∣2 ds+
∫ t
0
d2
(
µN (s), µ˜N (s)
)2
ds
]
≤ 4(T + 4)L2
∫ t
0
En
[∣∣Xni (s)− X˜ni (s)∣∣2 + 1n
n∑
k=1
∣∣Xnk (s)− X˜nk (s)∣∣2
]
ds.
Similarly, but also using assumption (A3),
En
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
∣∣Xn1 (s)− X˜n1 (s)∣∣2
]
≤ Cn
+ 8(T + 2)L2
∫ t
0
En
[∣∣Xn1 (s)− X˜n1 (s)∣∣2 + 1n
n∑
k=1
∣∣Xnk (s)− X˜nk (s)∣∣2
]
ds,
where Cn is equal to
80TK2
∫ T
0
En
[
1 + |Xn1 (s)|2 + |un1 (s)|2 + |u˜n1 (s)|2 +
1
n
n∑
k=1
|Xnk (s)|2
]
ds.
It follows that, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
1
n
n∑
i=1
En
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
∣∣Xni (s)− X˜ni (s)∣∣2
]
≤ Cn
n
+ 8(T + 4)L2
∫ t
0
En
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
sup
s˜∈[0,s]
∣∣Xni (s˜)− X˜ni (s˜)∣∣2
]
ds.
Therefore, by Gronwall’s lemma,
En
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣Xni (t)− X˜ni (t)∣∣2
]
≤ Cn
n
exp
(
8T (T + 4)L2
)
.
To complete the proof of (5.4), one checks that supn∈ICn <∞. But this is
a consequence of (5.3), condition (T), and Lemma 3.1.
Fourth step. We are going to show that
(5.5) lim sup
n→∞
Jn1 (u˜
n) ≤ Jˆ (m(0),Θmε ;m) .
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Let n ∈ I. Recall that X˜n1 solves the equation
X˜n1 (t) = ξ
n
1 +
∫ t
0
b
(
s, X˜n1 (s), µ˜
n(s), u˜n1 (s)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
σ
(
s, X˜n1 (s), µ˜
n(s)
)
dW n1 (s), t ∈ [0, T ].
Let X¯n1 be the unique solution to
X¯n1 (t) = ξ¯
n +
∫ t
0
b
(
s, X¯n1 (s),m(s), u˜
n
1 (s)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
σ
(
s, X¯n1 (s),m(s)
)
dW n1 (s), t ∈ [0, T ].
Then, by uniqueness in law and construction, for every n ∈ I,
Jˆ (m(0),Θmε ;m)
= En
[∫ T
0
f
(
t, X¯n1 (t),m(t), u˜
n
1 (t)
)
dt+ F
(
X¯n1 (T ),m(T )
)]
.
Using assumption (A2), Hölder’s inequality, Itô’s isometry, and Fubini’s the-
orem, we find that for every t ∈ [0, T ],
En
[∣∣∣X˜n1 (t)− X¯n1 (t)∣∣∣2
]
≤ 3En
[∣∣ξn1 − ξ¯n∣∣2]+ 6(T + 1)L2En
[∫ T
0
d2 (µ˜
n(s),m(s))2 ds
]
+ 6(T + 1)L2
∫ t
0
En
[∣∣∣X˜n1 (s)− X¯n1 (s)∣∣∣2
]
ds.
The limit relation (5.4) implies that (µ˜n(0))n∈I converges to m(0) in distri-
bution as P2(Rd)-valued random variables and that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
En
[
d2 (µ˜
n(t),m(t))2
]
n→∞−→ 0.
By choice of the random variables ξ¯n according to Lemma 5.2,
En
[∣∣ξn1 − ξ¯n∣∣2] n→∞−→ 0.
Therefore, by Gronwall’s lemma,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
En
[∣∣∣X˜n1 (t)− X¯n1 (t)∣∣∣2
]
n→∞−→ 0.
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Thanks to assumption (A4) and Hölder’s inequality,∣∣∣Jn1 (u˜n)− Jˆ (m(0),Θmε ;m)∣∣∣
≤ En
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣f(t, X˜n1 (t), µ˜n(t), u˜n1 (t)) − f(t, X¯n1 (t),m(t), u˜n1 (t))∣∣∣ dt
]
+En
[∣∣∣F (X˜n1 (T ), µ˜n(T ))− F (X¯n1 (T ),m(T ))∣∣∣] ,
≤
√
10L(1 +
√
T ) sup
t∈[0,T ]
En
[
|X˜n1 (t)− X¯n1 (t)|2 + d2 (µ˜n(t),m(t))2
]1/2
· sup
t∈[0,T ]
En
[
1 + |X˜n1 (t)|2 + |X¯n1 (t)|2 + d2 (µ˜n(t), δ0)2 + d2 (m(t), δ0)2
]1/2
.
By (5.3) together with Lemma 3.1 and an analogous estimate applied to X¯n1 ,
and since supt∈[0,T ] d2 (m(t), δ0)
2 <∞ by continuity, we have
sup
n∈I
sup
t∈[0,T ]
En
[
|X˜n1 (t)|2 + |X¯n1 (t)|2 + d2 (µ˜n(t), δ0)2 + d2 (m(t), δ0)2
]
<∞.
It follows that Jn1 (u˜
n)→ Jˆ (m(0),Θmε ;m) as n→∞, which establishes (5.5).
Fifth step. The limit relation (5.5) and the choice of Θmε imply that
lim sup
j→∞
J
Nj
1
(
u˜Nj
) ≤ Vˆ (m(0);m) + ε.
By hypothesis, un is a local εn-Nash equilibrium. By construction, u˜
n differs
from un only in component number one (= in∗ ), and u˜
n
1 is (Fn,1t )-adapted.
Therefore,
Jn1 (u
n) ≤ Jn1 (u˜n) + εn.
By choice of the index 1 = in∗ according to (S) and since εn → 0 by hypoth-
esis,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
Jni (u
n) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
Jn1 (u
n) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
Jn1 (u˜
n) .
It follows that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
Jni (u
n) ≤ Vˆ (m(0);m) + ε.
On the other hand, thanks to the second part of Lemma 5.3,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
Jni (u
n) ≥
∫
Ω
Jˆ
(
m(0), Qω ,m
)
P(dω).
47
It follows that ∫
Ω
Jˆ
(
m(0), Qω ,m
)
P(dω) ≤ Vˆ (m(0);m) + ε.
Since ε > 0 was arbitrary and Jˆ(m(0), Qω ,m) ≥ Vˆ (m(0);m) for every ω ∈ Ω
by definition of Vˆ , we conclude that
Jˆ
(
m(0), Qω,m
)
= Vˆ (m(0);m) for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω.
Remark 5.4. The proof of Theorem 5.1 gives some insight into why the
assumption that the limit flow of measures m is deterministic cannot sim-
ply be dropped. In the second step of the proof, we define a competitor
strategy u˜n1 for the deviating player (player one after relabeling) in terms
of the noise feedback function ψmε . In general, for any t ∈ [0, T ], ψmε (t, ·, ·)
depends on m through its values for all times, not only through its val-
ues up to time t. Therefore, if m were random, even taking for granted
the measurable dependence of ψmε on m, we might end up with a non-
adapted competitor strategy. Indeed, the natural choice for u˜n1 , namely
u˜n1 (t, ω)
.
= ψ
µnω(·)
ε
(
t, ξ¯n(ω),W n1 (·, ω)
)
, would in general yield a Γ-valued pro-
cess that would not be an admissible strategy for player one in the n-player
game.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 4.1, second part
Let Θ ∈ P(Z) be a solution of Eq. (4.2) with flow of measures m in the
sense of Definition 4.1. Using the local martingale property of Mmf for f
a monomial of first or second order as in the proof of Proposition 5.4.6 in
Karatzas and Shreve [1991, pp. 315-316], we find that, under Θ and with
respect to the filtration (Gt):
• Wˆ is a d1-dimensional vector of continuous local martingales with
Wˆ (0) = 0 and quadratic covariations〈
Wˆl, Wˆl˜
〉
(t) = t · δl,l˜, l, l˜ ∈ {1, . . . , d1};
• X¯ .= Xˆ − Xˆ(0)− ∫Γ×[0,·] b(s, Xˆ(s),m(s), γ)ρˆ(dγ, ds) is a d-dimensional
vector of continuous local martingales with quadratic covariations
〈
X¯j , X¯k
〉
(t) =
∫ t
0
(σσT)jk
(
s, Xˆ(s),m(s)
)
ds, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , d};
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• Wˆ , X¯ have quadratic covariations
〈
X¯k, Wˆl
〉
(t) =
∫ t
0
σkl
(
s, Xˆ(s),m(s)
)
ds,
where k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, l ∈ {1, . . . , d1}.
The local martingale property also holds with respect to the filtration (GΘt+);
see the solution to Problem 5.4.13 in Karatzas and Shreve [1991, pp. 318-
319, 392] and Remark 4.2 in Budhiraja et al. [2012]. By Lévy’s characteriza-
tion of Brownian motion [for instance, Theorem 3.3.16 in Karatzas and Shreve,
1991, p. 157], we see that Wˆ is a standard Wiener process with respect to
(GΘt+). As a consequence, the process
Y (t)
.
=
∫ t
0
σ(s, Xˆ(s),m(s)
)
dWˆ (s), t ∈ [0, T ],
is well defined and a d-dimensional vector of continuous local martingales
(under Θ with respect to (GΘt+)) with quadratic covariations
〈
Yj, Yk
〉
(t) =
∫ t
0
(σσT)jk
(
s, Xˆ(s),m(s)
)
ds, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , d},
〈
Yj, Wˆl
〉
(t) =
∫ t
0
σjl
(
s, Xˆ(s),m(s)
)
ds, j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, l ∈ {1, . . . , d1}.
The quadratic covariations between the components of the vectors of continu-
ous local martingales X¯, Y are given by [cf. Proposition 3.2.24 in Karatzas and Shreve,
1991, p. 147]
〈
Yj, X¯k
〉
(t) =
d1∑
l=1
∫ t
0
σjl
(
s, Xˆ(s),m(s)
)
d
〈
X¯k, Wˆl
〉
(s)
=
∫ t
0
(σσT)jk
(
s, Xˆ(s),m(s)
)
ds, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
It follows that X¯−Y is a d-dimensional vector of continuous local martingales
with X¯(0) = 0 = Y (0) and quadratic covariations
〈
X¯j − Yj, X¯k − Yk
〉
=
〈
X¯j , X¯k
〉− 〈Yj, X¯k〉− 〈X¯j , Yk〉+ 〈Yj, Yk〉 ≡ 0.
This implies [cf. Problem 1.5.12 in Karatzas and Shreve, 1991, p. 35] that
X¯ = Y Θ-almost surely, which establishes the solution property.
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B Tightness functions
Let S be a Polish space. A function g : S → [0,∞] is called a tightness
function on S if it is measurable and its sublevel sets {s ∈ S : g(s) ≤ c} are
pre-compact in S for all c ∈ [0,∞). If g is a tightness function on S, then
the function P(S) ∋ Θ 7→ ∫S g(s)Θ(ds) ∈ [0,∞] is a tightness function on
P(S); see, for instance, Theorem A.3.17 in Dupuis and Ellis [1997, p. 309].
B.1 A tightness function on R2
Let δ0 > 0. Define a function g˜ : R2 → [0,∞] by
g˜(r)
.
=
∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2+δ0r(dγ, dt).
We check that g˜ is a tightness function on R2. By construction, g˜ is mea-
surable. For c ∈ [0,∞), set
Ac
.
= {r ∈ R2 : g˜(r) ≤ c} .
Fix c ∈ [0,∞). Then we have to show that Ac is pre-compact in R2. This is
equivalent to showing that
a) Ac is pre-compact in R,
b) if (rn)n∈N ⊂ Ac is such that rn → r in R for some r ∈ R, then r ∈ R2
and
∫
Γ×[0,T ] |γ|2rn(dγ, dt)→
∫
Γ×[0,T ] |γ|2r(dγ, dt) as n→∞.
Pre-compactness of Ac inR is equivalent to tightness of Ac. This holds since,
for everyM > 0, the set {γ ∈ Γ : |γ| ≤M} is compact (by assumption (A6),
Γ is closed) and, by Markov’s inequality,
sup
r∈Ac
r {(γ, t) ∈ Γ× [0, T ] : |γ| > M} ≤ 1
M2+δ0
· sup
r∈Ac
g˜(r) ≤ c
M2+δ0
,
which tends to zero as M →∞.
As to the convergence of moments, let (rn)n∈N ⊂ Ac be such that rn → r
in R for some r ∈ R. Then, by Fatou’s lemma and Hölder’s inequality,
lim inf
n→∞
∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2rn(dγ, dt) ≥
∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2r(dγ, dt),
hence r ∈ Ac ⊂ R2. By convergence in R, we have, for every M > 0,
lim
n→∞
∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2 ∧M rn(dγ, dt) =
∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2 ∧M r(dγ, dt).
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On the other hand, again by Hölder’s and Markov’s inequality, for every
n ∈ N, every M > 0,∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2 · 1[M,∞)
(|γ|2) rn(dγ, dt)
≤
(∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2+δ0rn(dγ, dt)
) 1
2+δ0
· rn
{
(γ, t) ∈ Γ× [0, T ] : |γ|2 > M} 1+δ02+δ0
≤ c
1
2+δ0 · c
1+δ0
2+δ0 ·M−(1+δ0/2).
It follows that
sup
n∈N
∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2 · 1[M,∞)
(|γ|2) rn(dγ, dt) M→∞−→ 0,
hence limn→∞
∫
Γ×[0,T ] |γ|2rn(dγ, dt) =
∫
Γ×[0,T ] |γ|2r(dγ, dt).
B.2 A tightness function on P2(Z)
We check that the function g defined by (5.2) is a tightness function on
P2(Z). By construction, g is measurable (by continuity, the suprema ap-
pearing inside the second integral and in the definition of the modulus of
continuity can be restricted to countable index sets). Thus we have to show
that, given any c ∈ [0,∞), the set
A(c)
.
= {Θ ∈ P2(Z) : g(Θ) ≤ c}
is pre-compact in P2(Z). Fix c ∈ [0,∞). The pre-compactness of A(c) in
P2(Z) is equivalent to the following two conditions:
a) A(c) is tight in P(Z);
b) if (Θn)n∈N ⊂ A(c) is such that Θn converges to Θ¯ in P(Z) for some Θ¯ ∈
P(Z), then Θ¯ ∈ P2(Z) and
∫
Z dZ(s, s0)
2Θn(ds) → ∫Z dZ(s, s0)2 Θ¯(ds),
where s0 is some arbitrarily fixed element of Z.
To verify a), it is enough to check tightness of marginals, that is, to verify
that AX (c)
.
= {[Θ]X : Θ ∈ Ac} is tight in P(X ), AR2(c) .= {[Θ]R2 : Θ ∈ Ac}
is tight in P(R2), and AW(c) .= {[Θ]W : Θ ∈ Ac} is tight in P(W), where
[Θ]X , [Θ]R1 , [Θ]W denote the marginal distributions of Θ on X , R2, andW,
respectively. Thanks to Markov’s inequality and the Ascoli-Arzelà criterion
[for instance, Theorem 8.2 in Billingsley, 1968, p. 55], AX (c), AW(c) are tight
in P(X ) and P(W), respectively. The tightness of AR2(c) in P(R2) follows
from the fact that the mapping
R2 ∋ r 7→
∫
Γ×[0,T ]
|γ|2+δ0 r(dγ, dt) ∈ [0,∞]
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is a tightness function on R2; see Appendix B.1.
In order to check b), let (Θn)n∈N ⊂ A(c) be such that Θn converges
to Θ¯ in P(Z) for some Θ¯ ∈ P(Z). By a version of Fatou’s lemma [cf.
Theorem A.3.12 Dupuis and Ellis, 1997, p. 307],
lim inf
n→∞
∫
Z
‖ϕ‖2+δ0X Θn(dϕ, dr, dw) ≥
∫
Z
‖ϕ‖2+δ0X Θ¯(dϕ, dr, dw).
By definition of dZ and of g, and thanks to Hölder’s inequality, it follows
that Θ ∈ P2(Z). By convergence of (Θn)n∈N to Θ¯ in P(Z), we have for
every M > 0,
lim
n→∞
∫
Z
M ∧ ‖ϕ‖2X Θn(dϕ, dr, dw) =
∫
Z
M ∧ ‖ϕ‖2X Θ¯(dϕ, dr, dw).
It suffices to show that (recall the notation for the marginal distributions)
lim sup
M→∞
sup
n∈N
∫
X
1{‖ϕ‖2
X
≥M} · ‖ϕ‖2X [Θn]X (dϕ) = 0.
But this is true by Hölder’s inequality, the Markov inequality and the fact
that supn∈N g(Θ
n) ≤ c <∞ by hypothesis since
sup
n∈N
∫
X
1{‖ϕ‖2
X
≥M} · ‖ϕ‖2X [Θn]X (dϕ)
≤ sup
n∈N
{
[Θn]X
({‖ϕ‖2X ≥M}) δ02+δ0 ·
(∫
X
‖ϕ‖2+δ0X [Θn]X (dϕ)
) 2
2+δ0
}
≤M−
δ0
2+δ0 · c
2δ0
(2+δ0)
2 · c
2
2+δ0 ,
which tends to zero as M →∞.
C Proof of Lemma 5.3: local martingale property
We have to show that, for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω, any f : Rd × Rd1 → R
monomial of first or second order, Mµωf is a (Gt)-local martingale under
Qω; cf. (iii) in Definition 4.1. Recall that µω is the flow of measures in M2
induced by Qω, that is, µω(t) = Qω ◦(Xˆ(t))−1, t ∈ [0, T ]. If Θ ∈ P2(Z), then
the flow of measures induced by Θ is in M2; cf. Remark 4.2 above. Thus,
we may write MΘf meaning the process M
m
f with m the flow of measures in
M2 given by m(t) .= Θ ◦ (Xˆ(t))−1, t ∈ [0, T ].
We closely follow the proof of Lemma 5.2 in Budhiraja et al. [2012]. The
canonical space Z there is slightly bigger than our Z here (relaxed controls in
R1 instead of R2), but this causes no problems since the smaller space gives
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L2-integrability of controls (instead of L1) and we have the corresponding
distributional convergence of Qn to Q as P2(Z)-valued random variables; cf.
Lemma 5.1 above.
In verifying the local martingale property ofMµωf , we will work with ran-
domized stopping times. This will ensure almost sure continuity of certain
mappings even if the diffusion coefficient σσT is degenerate. The random-
ized stopping times live on an extension (Zˆ,B(Zˆ)) of the measurable space
(Z,B(Z)) and are adapted to a canonical filtration (Gˆt) in B(Zˆ) given by
Zˆ .= Z × [0, 1], Gˆt .= Gt × B([0, 1]), t ∈ [0, T ].
Any random object defined on (Z,B(Z)) also lives on (Zˆ,B(Zˆ)), and no
notational distinction will be made. Let λ denote the uniform distribution on
B([0, 1]). Any probability measure Θ on B(Z) induces a probability measure
on B(Zˆ) given by Θ⊗ λ. For k ∈ N, define a stopping time τk on (Zˆ,B(Zˆ))
with respect to the filtration (Gˆt) by setting, for ((ϕ, r, w), a) ∈ Z × [0, 1],
τk((ϕ, r, w), a)
.
= inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : v((ϕ, r, w), t) ≥ k + a} ,
where
v
(
(ϕ, r, w), t
) .
=
∫
Γ×[0,t]
|y|2 r(dy, ds) + sup
s∈[0,t]
|ϕ(s)|+ sup
s∈[0,t]
|w(s)|.
Then, given any Θ ∈ P(Z), τk ր T as k →∞ and the mapping
Z × [0, 1] ∋ ((ϕ, r, w), a) 7→ τk((ϕ, r, w), a) ∈ [0, T ]
is continuous with probability one under Θ⊗ λ.
Notice that if MΘf is a local martingale with respect to (Gˆt) under Θ⊗λ
with localizing sequence of stopping times (τk)k∈N, then M
Θ
f is also a local
martingale with respect to (Gt) under Θ with localizing sequence of stopping
times (τk(., 0))k∈N; see the appendix in Budhiraja et al. [2012]. Thus, it
suffices to prove the martingale property of MΘf up till time τk with respect
to the filtration (Gˆt) and the probability measure Θ⊗ λ.
Clearly, the process MΘf (· ∧ τk) is a (Gˆt)-martingale under Θ ⊗ λ if and
only if
(C.1) EΘ⊗λ
[
Ψ · (MΘf (t1 ∧ τk)−MΘf (t0 ∧ τk))] = 0
for all t0, t1 ∈ [0, T ] with t0 ≤ t1, and Gˆt0 -measurable Ψ ∈ Cb(Zˆ). To verify
the martingale property ofMΘf (.∧ τk), it is enough to check that (C.1) holds
for any countable collection of times t0, t1 which is dense in [0, T ] and any
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countable collection of functions Ψ ∈ Cb(Zˆ) that generates the (countably
many) σ-algebras Gˆt0 . Recall that the collection of test functions f for which
a martingale property must be verified consists of just monomials of degree
one or two, and hence is finite. Thus, we can choose a countable collection
T ⊂ N×[0, T ]2×Cb(Zˆ)×C2(Rd×Rd1) of test parameters such that whenever
Θ ∈ P2(Z) satisfies (C.1) for all (k, t0, t1,Ψ, f) ∈ T , then MΘf is a (Gt)-local
martingale under Θ.
Let (k, t0, t1,Ψ, f) ∈ T . Define a mapping Φ = Φ(k,t0,t1,Ψ,f) : P2(Z)→ R
by
Φ(Θ)
.
= EΘ⊗λ
[
Ψ · (MΘf (t1 ∧ τk)−MΘf (t0 ∧ τk))] .
We claim that Φ is continuous on P2(Z). To check this, take Θ ∈ P2(Z) and
any sequence (Θl)l∈N ⊂ P2(Z) that converges to Θ in P2(Z). Let ml, l ∈ N,
m be the induced flows of measures in M2, that is, ml(t) .= Θl ◦ (Xˆ(t))−1,
m(t)
.
= Θ ◦ (Xˆ(t))−1, t ∈ [0, T ]. Recall the definition of MΘf = Mmf in
(4.3) and (4.4) above. By Assumption (A3) and definition of the stopping
time τk, the integrand in (4.3) is bounded. By continuity of b, σ according
to Assumption (A2), the almost sure continuity of τk under Θ ⊗ λ, the
extended mapping theorem [Theorem 5.5 in Billingsley, 1968, p. 34] applied
to the relaxed controls in (4.3) (plus convergence of first moments by choice
of the topology on R2), and the fact that Ψ ∈ Cb(Zˆ), it follows that the
mapping
Zˆ ∋ zˆ 7→ Ψ(zˆ) · (Mmf (t1 ∧ τk(zˆ), zˆ)−Mmf (t0 ∧ τk(zˆ), zˆ)) ∈ R
is bounded and Θ ⊗ λ-almost surely continuous. By weak convergence and
the mapping theorem [Theorem 5.1 in Billingsley, 1968, p. 30], it follows that
EΘl⊗λ
[
Ψ · (Mmf (t1 ∧ τk)−Mmf (t0 ∧ τk))]
l→∞−→ EΘ⊗λ
[
Ψ · (Mmf (t1 ∧ τk)−Mmf (t0 ∧ τk))] .(C.2)
Since (Θl)l∈N converges to Θ in P2(Z), we have that {Θl : l ∈ N} ∪ {Θ}
is compact in P2(Z). By continuity of projections, dominated convergence
and the definition of dZ , we have liml→∞ d2
(
ml(t),m(t)
)
= 0 uniformly in
t ∈ [0, T ]. This together with Assumption (A2) and the construction of τk
implies that
sup
t∈[0,T ],zˆ∈Zˆ
∣∣∣Mmlf (t ∧ τk(zˆ), zˆ)−Mmf (t ∧ τk(zˆ), zˆ)∣∣∣ l→∞−→ 0.
Since Ψ is bounded, it follows by dominated convergence that∣∣EΘl⊗λ [Ψ · (Mmf (t1 ∧ τk)−Mmf (t0 ∧ τk))]
−EΘl⊗λ
[
Ψ ·
(
Mmlf (t1 ∧ τk)−Mmlf (t0 ∧ τk)
)]∣∣∣ l→∞−→ 0.
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In combination with (C.2), this implies Φ(Θl)→ Φ(Θ) as l →∞.
By hypothesis, the sequence (Qn)n∈I of P2(Z)-valued random variables
converges to Q in distribution. Hence the mapping theorem and the conti-
nuity of Φ imply Φ(Qn) → Φ(Q) in distribution as n → ∞. Let n ∈ I. By
construction of Qn and Fubini’s theorem, for every ω ∈ Ωn,
Φ(Qnω) = EQnω⊗λ
[
Ψ · (Mµnωf (t1 ∧ τk)−Mµnωf (t0 ∧ τk))]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
Ψ
(
(Xni (·, ω), ρn,iω ,W ni (·, ω)), a
)
·
(
f
(
Xni (t1 ∧ τn,ik (ω, a), ω),W ni (t1 ∧ τn,ik (ω, a), ω)
)
− f(Xni (t0 ∧ τn,ik (ω, a), ω),W ni (t0 ∧ τn,ik (ω, a), ω))
−
∫ t1∧τn,ik (ω,a)
t0∧τ
n,i
k
(ω,a)
Aµnωuni (s,ω),s(f)
(
Xni (s, ω),W
n
i (s, ω)
)
ds
)
da,
where A is defined by (4.4) and τn,ik (ω, a) is defined like τk((ϕ, r, w), a) with
ϕ replaced by Xni (·, ω), r replaced by ρn,iω , the relaxed control corresponding
to uni (·, ω), and w replaced by W ni (·, ω).
Let a ∈ [0, 1]. By Itô’s formula, it holds Pn-almost surely that
f
(
Xni (t1 ∧ τn,ik ),W ni (t1 ∧ τn,ik )
) − f(Xni (t0 ∧ τn,ik ),W ni (t0 ∧ τn,ik ))
−
∫ t1∧τn,ik
t0∧τ
n,i
k
Aµnuni (s),s(f)
(
Xni (s),W
n
i (s)
)
ds
=
∫ t1∧τn,ik
t0∧τ
n,i
k
∇xf
(
Xni (s),W
n
i (s)
)T
σ
(
s,Xni (s), µ
n(s)
)
dW ni (s)
+
∫ t1∧τn,ik
t0∧τ
n,i
k
∇yf
(
Xni (s),W
n
i (s)
)
T
dW ni (s),
where τn,ik = τ
n,i
k (·, a) and τn,ik , µn, Xni , uni all live on (Ωn,Fn). By Fubini’s
theorem and Jensen’s inequality, it follows that
En
[
Φ(Qn)2
]
≤
∫ 1
0
En
[
EQnω
[
Ψ(·, a) ·
(
M
Qnω
f (t1 ∧ τk(·, a)) −MQ
n
ω
f (t0 ∧ τk(·, a))
)]2]
da.
Let again a ∈ [0, 1]. By the Itô isometry, the independence of the Wiener
processes W n1 , . . . ,W
n
n , and because Ψ(·, a) is Gt0-measurable and τk(·, a) is
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a stopping time with respect to (Gt), it holds that
En
[
EQnω
[
Ψ(., a) ·
(
M
Qnω
f (t1 ∧ τk(·, a)) −M
Qnω
f (t0 ∧ τk(·, a))
)]2]
= En
[( 1
n
n∑
i=1
∫ t1∧τn,ik (·,a)
t0∧τ
n,i
k
(·,a)
Ψ(·, a) · 1
{τn,i
k
(·,a)≥t0}
·
(
∇yf
(
Xni (s),W
n
i (s)
)
T
+∇xf
(
Xni (s),W
n
i (s)
)T
σ
(
s,Xni (s), µ
n(s)
))
dW ni (s)
)2]
=
1
n2
n∑
i=1
En
[∫ t1∧τn,ik (·,a)
t0∧τ
n,i
k
(·,a)
∣∣∣Ψ(·, a) · 1{τn,i
k
(·,a)≥t0}
·
(
∇yf
(
Xni (s),W
n
i (s)
)T
+∇xf
(
Xni (s),W
n
i (s)
)
T
σ
(
s,Xni (s), µ
n(s)
))∣∣∣2ds
]
n→∞−→ 0.
Since (Φ(Qn))n∈I converges to Φ(Q) in distribution, it follows that for
each (k, t0, t1,Ψ, f) ∈ T we can choose a set Z(k,t0,t1,Ψ,f) ∈ F such that
P(Z(k,t0,t1,Ψ,f)) = 0 and
Φ(Qω) = Φ(k,t0,t1,Ψ,f)(Qω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω \ Z(k,t0,t1,Ψ,f).
Let Z be the union of all sets Z(k,t0,t1,Ψ,f), (k, t0, t1,Ψ, f) ∈ T . Since T is
countable, we have Z ∈ F , P(Z) = 0 and
Φ(k,t0,t1,Ψ,f)(Qω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω \ Z, all (k, t0, t1,Ψ, f) ∈ T .
By definition of Φ, this implies that, for every test function f , Mµωf is a
(Gt)-local martingale under Qω for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω.
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